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Abstract 
 This thesis seeks to explain why the Department of Homeland Security had 
difficulty fulfilling its roles when it was formed, specifically its role as grant administrator.  
Role theory surmises that conflict arises from unclear expectations, conflicting expectations, 
and too many roles.  This study utilized various public testimonies, legislation, and other 
government documents to examine how the missions of the twenty-two agencies that were 
merged together to make up DHS changed.  Even though DHS has changed continually 
over the five years since its existence most employees seem to be clear on the mission of the 
organization in which they work.  However, there is still a considerable amount of conflict 
resulting from the agencies being forced together in such a frankensteinian way.   
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 August 29, 2005 hurricane Katrina, a category 3 hurricane, struck the gulf coast.  
The hurricane itself brought significant damage to the region, but also breached the 
levees of New Orleans causing catastrophic damage the area.  Many people believed that 
this was the first test of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that had been 
created only two years previously.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) became a part of DHS during the largest government restructuring to take place 
since President Truman.  DHS took twenty-two independent government agencies with 
over 180,000 employees and merged them into one cabinet level department.  Merging 
with DHS relegated FEMA from an independent agency to part of the much larger DHS, 
but gave access to a wider range of resources (PBS, 2005).  The merger also altered the 
focus of FEMA from all-hazards to terrorism.  According to the Government Accounting 
Office (GAO), nearly three out of every four FEMA grant dollars in 2005 went to 
programs solely concerned with terrorism-related disasters (GAO, 2005).   Not only did 
the majority of grant funding go to terrorism-related disasters, but training was also 
focused on terrorism incidents.  The GAO found that thirty-one of thirty-nine first 
responder departments agreed that training was adequate for terrorist attacks, but not 
natural disasters (PBS, 2005).  The alteration of mission from an all-hazards focus to one 
of terrorism led to an unclear role for FEMA and conflict.   
The purpose of this study is to examine how role theory explains the conflict 
within the various agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and how that 
conflict affected its ability to accomplish its role within the government.  By ascertaining 
which agencies assumed new roles after becoming a part of DHS, this study will observe 
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the ways in which they were structurally incapable of reconciling these post-restructuring 
new roles with their pre-restructuring duties and were thus unable to fulfill DHS’ stated 
mission of providing guidance to the states on homeland security funding issues.  This 
study examines the missions of the twenty-two agencies that were combined to create 
DHS, looking towards the various laws that created DHS and other Congressional 
testimony by principal employees of DHS and others.  First, this study will highlight how 
DHS was created and how the current grant process operates.  Then, this study will 
examine the sources of conflict between DHS and the various audiences that held 
expectations for DHS.  Then, this study will examine role theory literature highlighting 
how role theory helps to explain this conflict.  Finally, this study will examine lessons 
learned and how to rectify any role conflict that is present. 
Methodology 
 Understanding the basic tenets of role theory, this study hypothesizes that as the 
mission of the twenty-two agencies changed from independent government entities to 
components of a larger DHS, role conflict increased and there was less satisfaction with 
DHS as a whole, both from employees and the audiences (the states, Congress, other 
agencies) who had high expectations for the new department.  As duties were added to an 
agency, prioritizing those duties added strain to the role that the agency performed before 
becoming a part of the DHS and it in turn experienced role conflict.  In addition, the more 
that agencies were called on to coordinate with each other without a clarification of roles, 
the more conflict resulted.   
To understand the effect that mission change had on each agency that merged to 
form DHS, this study examines all twenty-two agencies before the creation of DHS, in 
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2002 and after.  This study utilized the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (PL 107-296) to 
obtain the mission Congress intended each agency to have after it was incorporated into 
DHS.  This study examined Congressional testimony, speeches by leaders within DHS, 
and legislation concerning DHS to see how the DHS leadership identified the roles of the 
agencies within DHS.  This study examined the Federal Capital Human survey from 2004 
and 2006 and the Merit Systems Promotion Board survey from 2005 to see how the 
employees of DHS felt about their performance and mission accomplishment.  While 
other functions transferred into DHS, as well this paper will only focus on the main 
twenty-two agencies that were transferred into the new department.        
The Creation of a Department 
The creation of DHS was not the only option available to the President after 
September 11th.  It was not, in fact, the first option enacted.  The first federal 
organizational response was to create an Executive Order coordinator position, which 
President Bush did on October 8, 2001 with Executive Order (EO) 13228.  This 
established an Office of Homeland Security (OHS) within the White House.  Governor 
Tom Ridge was appointed to head the office as the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security.  The Office of Homeland Security was tasked with “coordinating the 
executive branch's efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and 
recover from terrorist attacks within the United States” (EO No. 13228, 2001).  
According to the Executive Order, the main mission of the office was to “develop and 
coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the U.S. 
from terrorist threats or attacks” (EO No. 13228, 2001).  
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The executive order emphasized that every federal agency had a degree of 
responsibility for homeland security.  The advantage of having an OHS is that “the 
director is positioned to rise above the particular interests of any one particular agency, 
and he is located close to the president to resolve cross-agency disagreements.  The OHS 
also provides flexibility by relying on the broad executive power of the president” (Wise, 
2002).  This office was envisioned as functioning similarly to the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, a coordinating body that would coalesce all executive branch 
parties, which concern or relate to homeland security.  There were a number of 
disadvantages to only have an OHS primarily, no accountability to Congress.  “It is 
difficult to believe Congress would permit the development of a national strategy for 
countering terrorism to exist for very long without establishing political accountability to 
the legislative branch.  Another disadvantage is that without a legislative framework 
providing budgetary authority and staff, the power of the office is uncertain and subject 
to the vagaries of the president or future presidents’ attention to homeland security, which 
can wax and wane over the years ahead” (Wise, 2002).  These disadvantages ultimately 
led to the downfall of the OHS.     
In 1998 Defense Secretary, William H. Cohen, chartered a bi-partisan 
commission to provide a comprehensive review of national security for the emerging era.  
The Hart-Rudman Commission, named for its co-chairs, issued a final report 
recommending “the creation of an independent National Homeland Security Agency with 
responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government 
activities involved in homeland security” (U.S. Commission on National Security/21st 
Century, 2001).  The commission further recommended that the new agency be built 
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“upon the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with the three 
organizations currently on the front line of border security—the Coast Guard, the 
Customs Service, and the Border Patrol—transferred to it.  The National Homeland 
Security Agency would not only protect American lives, but also assume responsibility 
for overseeing the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure including information 
technology.  The National Homeland Security Agency Director would have Cabinet 
status and would be a statutory advisor to the National Security Council” (U.S 
Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001).  The Commission also 
recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) restructure, the National Guard be 
tasked with homeland security as its primary mission, and finally that Congress 
restructure itself so as “to accommodate this Executive Branch realignment, and that it 
also form a special select committee for homeland security to provide Congressional 
support and oversight in this critical area” (U.S Commission on National Security/21st 
Century, 2001).  At the time, the responsibility for national security was diffused across a 
number of Congressional committees.  According to Perrow (2006) there were “eleven 
Senate committees and fourteen House committees, as well as a large number of 
subcommittees, eighty-eight in all overseeing homeland security efforts.”  
Shortly after September 11th, Senator Lieberman (I-CT), then Chairman of the 
Governmental Affairs Committee, called “for the establishment of a permanent, 
homeland security agency with broad responsibilities to protect against threats to the 
American people, including terrorist attacks” (U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental 
Affairs, Press Statement, 2001).  On October 11, 2001 Senator Lieberman and Senator 
Specter (R-PA) introduced S. 1534, a bill to establish the Department of Homeland 
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Security (DHS).  This bill transferred FEMA, the U.S Customs Service from the 
Department of Treasury, the Border Patrol from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the 
U.S. Coast Guard, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) and the Institute 
of Information Infrastructure Protection from the Department of Commerce, and the 
National Infrastructure Protection Center and that National Domestic Preparedness Office 
from the DOJ into the new cabinet-level agency (Act to Establish a Department of 
Homeland Security, 2001).  These agencies were to be organized into three directorates: 
the directorate of prevention, the directorate of critical infrastructure, and the directorate 
of emergency preparedness and response.  Under this bill, Congress would not 
restructure, committees would maintain the same oversight they had previously.   
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 passed both the Senate and the House and 
was signed into law on November 25, 2002.  This bill created a much larger department 
than that proposed by Senator Lieberman (I-CT) and Senator Specter (R-PA).  The White 
House proposed more agencies transferred into DHS and transferred them into four 
directorates.  Again Congress did not restructure, committees maintained the same 
oversight as they had previously.    
After the bill was signed into law, “President Bush set a four-month deadline for 
DHS to open its doors to the twenty-two agencies that had to move” (Perrow, 2006).  
However, this move was in name only as there was limited space in which the DHS 
headquarters was set-up and the majority of agencies would not move physical locations.  
The fact that no agencies moved physical locations contributed to the initial confusion 
and conflict within the Department.  The Department formally came into being on March 
1, 2003 although a skeleton version had been in existence since January 24th (The 
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American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2003).  Officials stated that more 
than 180,000 employees were transferred into DHS from twenty-two agencies.  However, 
a number of the departments, that were losing agencies, decimated those agencies slated 
to transfer prior to them being subsumed into DHS.  John Rollins, who became Chief of 
Staff for the new DHS intelligence section, recalls absolute chaos in the early months of 
the new Department.  In particular within his office “there was no Under Secretary, no 
Assistant Secretary and just ten aides out of the three hundred the office was supposed to 
hire.  Many of the new DHS offices had been picked apart by the Departments from 
which they came; Rollins had moved with the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection 
Center, one of three of the center’s one-hundred and fifty staffers to make the switch” 
(Glasser & Grunwald, 2005).  According to reports from the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) by September 30, 2003 the DHS permanent workforce 
was 109,655 employees.1  However, the Partnership for Public Service reports that DHS 
had 126,276 employees in fiscal year (FY) 2004, which began October 1, 2003.  Both of 
these numbers indicate that DHS lost thousands of federal employees who were to have 
transferred from their previous Departments.   
 Not only were the twenty-two agencies transferred into the new Department, there 
were also several human resource systems, over nineteen accounting offices, 8,500 
buildings, $44.6 billion in assets, and $36.7 billion in liabilities.  Each agency transferred 
brought its previous appropriations levels with it.  Congress passed a consolidated 
supplemental appropriations bill in February of 2003, however DHS was not created until 
                                                 
 
1
 This is only a report of permanent full-time employees and doesn’t account for contractors and part-time 
employees.       
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March of that year, so the supplemental only provided marginal increases in funding for a 
number of programs within the new Department.   
 Private sector mergers and acquisitions typically take between five and seven 
years to function effectively, and that sector has more advantages than the public sector 
(Perrow, 2006).  Public sector mergers have to deal with more stakeholders and power 
centers, less management flexibility, and greater transparency than in the private sector 
(Walker, 2002).  The sheer magnitude of the merger was simply overwhelming for all the 
involved parties.  Department leaders “worked almost full time on the merger, too busy to 
do much more than manage their inboxes, referee internal turf wars, and wage losing 
battles with departments that commanded more clout at the White House” (Glasser & 
Grunwald, 2005).  Congress also required the Department to report to it regularly, within 
its first year of creation, Congress called on the leaders of DHS to testify one hundred 
and sixty times, about every day and a half (Perrow, 2006).  All of this detracted from the 
agency’s ability to fulfill its mission and to cope with the high expectations leveled upon 
the new department.   
Areas of Conflict 
According to Steven Stehr (2005), there are two coordination problems within 
homeland security.  The first is that large-scale organizations often struggle to coordinate 
the efforts of their sub-units.  This problem is exacerbated when a number of agencies 
with pre-existing missions and organizational cultures are merged, as in the case of DHS 
(Stehr, 2005).  The second problem occurs when multiple organizations in a given policy 
area have overlapping responsibilities and must work within inter-organizational 
networks to address public problems.  Homeland security includes not only DHS, but 
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local and state governments and public health officials.  Depending on the type of 
emergency, the list of relevant actors could be staggering.   
 A number of government agencies survey full time staff to understand how 
governmental organizations are operating.  The Federal Human Capital Survey (FHCS) is 
a survey of full-time permanent employees that measures their perceptions of whether 
and to what extent conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their 
agencies.  The survey was first administered in 2002 and has continued to be reissued 
every two years since.  The DHS was not established until 2003, so the first measure of 
the department came in 2004.  In 2006 the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), 
which administers the survey, sent the survey to 390,657 employees from the major 
agencies on the President’s Management Council and the small/independent agencies.  
The Office of Personnel management received 221,479 responses for a response rate of 
57 percent across the government (OPM, Message to Federal Employees, 2006).  The 
DHS is a part of the President’s Management Council and had 10,367 employees respond 
in 2006, which is a 56 percent response rate (OPM, FHCS, 2006).  This number is similar 
to the number of respondents for 2004.  The OPM then weighted the responses to average 
them across the responding agencies, 10,367 represents the sample of the DHS 
population.  All of the questions were on the standard Likert scale.  Employees rated 
statements on whether they strongly agreed, agreed, neither agreed nor disagreed, 
disagreed, strongly disagreed, or didn’t know.  Overall the DHS did not score well on the 
survey.  However, there were a few high points. 
 A number of the questions asked the employee to rate the mission, goals and 
priorities of the agency; 76.4 percent of the respondents stated that they knew how their 
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work related to the agency’s goals and priorities, and 48.6 percent believed that managers 
communicated the goals and priorities of the organization (OPM, FHCS, 2006).  As is 
evident by these responses, the majority of DHS employees indicated that they 
understood the mission of the overall mission of DHS; however, they may not have 
understood how their organization fits within DHS as a whole and therefore may 
experience role conflict.  Addressing the FHCS results before Congress, DHS Under 
Secretary for Management, Paul Schneider (2007) stated, “although the general results of 
the survey were disappointing we are encouraged by the fact that DHS employees have 
passion for our mission. 89 percent of employees report that they believe the work they 
do is important, and 80 percent like the work that they do. This is a strong foundation to 
build upon for improvement.” 
 The U.S Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) is an independent, quasi-
judicial agency in the Executive branch that serves as the guardian of Federal merit 
systems (MSPB, About MSPB, 2008).  Since 1983, the MSPB has surveyed the Federal 
workforce every two years to measure the “health” of federal merit systems principles 
(Merit Principles Survey, Welcome, 2007).  In 2005, the MSPB sent 74,000 employees 
the survey and received 36,926 responses, a response rate of approximately 50 percent.  
The MSPB only surveyed 24 agencies, one of which was the DHS.  The first series of 
questions asked about the understanding of the agency mission, and within the DHS, 90 
percent of respondents replied that they understood their agency’s mission (MSPB, 2005 
Survey, 2005).  Again this indicated understanding of the overall mission of DHS and not 
of the individual agencies within the organization.  The only agency that did worse than 
DHS on this question was the Department of Transportation (DOT), which had 89 
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percent of respondents agreeing that they understood their agency’s mission.  The MSPB 
reported that the lower understanding might be due to a reorganization of the agencies 
that became a part of the DHS.  “A recently restructured organization is still defining its 
mission and communicating the nature of that mission to its employees.  Even employees 
who do not change jobs in such reorganization can be expected to be somewhat unsure 
that their mission remains the same.  A comparison of the degree to which agency 
mission is understood in recently restructured organizations (92 percent) versus relatively 
stable organizations (98 percent) provides some support for this assertion” (MSPB, 2005 
Survey, 2005).  Only 37 percent of respondents stated that their organization had 
remained stable over the past two years preceding the survey (MSPB, 2005 Survey, 
2005).  DHS has continually changed since it was created, this may correlate with its low 
numbers, however this was a snapshot in time during the early years of the department.     
 One byproduct of the myriad of changes that DHS has gone through is the effect 
on services and products.  Only 51 percent of DHS employees believe that their agency 
produces high quality products and services (MSPB, 2005 Survey, 2005).  DHS was the 
lowest ranked agency out of 24 agencies on the MSPB survey.  43.3 percent of 
employees also do not feel as if they are rewarded for providing high quality products 
and services to customers (OPM, FHCS, 2006).  Due to the fact that employees do not 
feel rewarded for providing high quality products, this may directly relate to why only 51 
percent of employees believe that the DHS produces high quality products and services. 
 Another area where the DHS ranked the lowest of the 24 agencies participating 
was job satisfaction; only 58 percent of employees were satisfied with their job (MSPB, 
2005 Survey, 2005).  Similarly, only 56.6 percent of employees of DHS stated that they 
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were satisfied with their job considering everything (OPM, FHCS, 2006).  On the FHCS 
survey 79.7 percent of respondents agreed that they liked the kind of work that they did.  
Employees may like what they do, but not be satisfied with their job due to lack of clarity 
of expectations for their role within the agency.  35 percent of the DHS respondents 
stated that they were likely to leave their agency within the next 12 months as well 
(MSPB, 2005 Survey, 2005).  This could also be attributed to retirement eligibility.  The 
OPM anticipates as many as 60 percent of the workforce will qualify for retirement over 
the next 10 years (OPM, FHCS, 2006).  
The agencies that make up the DHS have gone through a myriad of rapid change 
and have had to transform into a unified cabinet-level department with new roles to 
accompany that change and new processes to accomplish their goals.  The agencies had 
to learn to work together and function as one team, when in a number of situations the 
employees may have felt a bit more competition with their new colleagues.  In creating a 
new department, several obstacles were present including establishing a new 
organizational identity without moving the agencies’ physical location or altering the 
reliance of employees on the old organization for administrative support, answers to 
questions, and even clarification of their role and how to balance coordination between 
the two organizations.   
Uncertainty and ambiguity are continually present when undertaking a restructuring 
of any kind; it is even more so in a large restructuring where the employees remain in the 
same location.  Trying to find a headquarters for DHS has been a controversial and time-
consuming task.  After five years, DHS is still spread out over 40 locations and 70 
buildings throughout the Washington, DC area.  Not only did the agencies that make up 
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DHS not have one location to report to, they also had to find new employees to fill a 
number of positions in which the employees did not make the transition to the new 
department, but chose to remain with their old department.  For some agencies, this 
meant that they began their work in DHS with a significant loss of institutional 
knowledge and a burden to hire a number of new employees quickly.  This loss of 
institutional knowledge also affects organizational identity.  One-way in which 
organizations establish a culture is through the emphasis of ‘this is how we do things 
around here.’  Without the established routine, organizations can have difficulty creating 
new cultures within the DHS.  However, they may also lose an efficient way of 
performing their roles.  
 Another source of conflict in establishing an organizational culture and trying to 
relieve conflict for employees was the placement of the agencies within DHS.  Some 
agencies were placed in directorates that did not match the goals and mission of the pre-
restructured mission and goals of the agency.  Some agencies were separated into a 
number of new agencies and placed into different directorates, however the agencies 
physical location never changed.  The placement of an agency in a directorate can 
contribute to conflict because the expectations that the DHS has forth for a specific 
directorate may not be the same as the expectations for the agencies that were placed 
within it.  Therefore the agency will experience role conflict because their mission does 
not contribute to the overall mission of the directorate.  Not only will the employees 
experience conflict because of this, but also they may not then understand where their 
agency fits within the DHS. 
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 Employees not only had to understand their role within a directorate, but also the 
other agencies that were placed in that directorate with them.  In a number of cases, if 
two agencies work on similar areas and there is mission overlap the agencies may 
experience a turf-war.  The leaders of the DHS had to motivate employees to work 
towards a common goal and communicate that employees are on the same team within 
the department.  However, due to identity and role confusion these turf-wars did not just 
dissipate because the employees were told that they now composed a common team.   
 Employees did not just have to work with other employees with whom they may 
have a conflict with, but they also had to deal with the addition of new roles, which were 
different from their original mission.  Employees did not just acquire new roles, but new 
roles were emphasized over the old roles, one example is FEMA employees; terrorism 
was emphasized over all-hazards.  Employees not only needed to switch fluidly between 
these new and old roles, in some cases the new roles appear to be incompatible with the 
old roles.   
 Some offices within the DHS were new.  They not only had to deal with the role 
conflict and identity issues that accompany any merger, they also had to deal with being a 
start-up organization.  Each organization within the DHS was expected to immediately 
perform exceptionally.  All agencies within the DHS were given a large magnitude of 
work as well.  However, large bureaucracies with unclear roles often have problems 
performing efficiently or quickly.  The DHS also had numerous audiences and each with 
different expectations for the organization.   
 State and local governments expected assistance for preparing for another terrorist 
attack, while Congress expected grants to be allocated quickly and all roles to be fulfilled.  
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Employees expected DHS to be responsive to their needs and give guidance to how they 
should perform their jobs.  The President and public expected DHS to fulfill all roles 
assigned to it both pre-merger and post-merger.  While these expectations may be 
congruous, the varied expectations from different audiences contributed to role overload, 
role conflict, and role ambiguity.  It also led to a lack of trust; “the trust necessary to 
make homeland security intergovernmental partnerships work is lacking among many 
city and state officials, as well as some DHS employees due to the lack of role clarity” 
(Stehr, 2005). 
In Sum 
 DHS was created specifically to be a unifier of the agencies that monitor and 
enforce laws at the border, and provide state and local municipalities a centralized 
location to ask questions and apply for grants, and enhance information sharing to the 
states.  Mergers and acquisitions take years, the President gave DHS four months to 
combine twenty-two agencies, approximately 180,000 employees, billions of dollars in 
assets and liabilities, and numerous HR and accounting systems, into four functioning 
directorates.  Such a massive reorganization takes time even when employees change 
physical locations.  The employees that merged together to form the DHS not only had to 
deal with remaining in the same physical location, but they also had to learn to work 
together on the same team, learn new roles, and meet high expectations from a number of 
audiences.  DHS still does not have a central location and employees do not understand 
how to balance their various roles.  The frankensteinian way, i.e. a monstrous creation 
that ruins its creator, that the Department was developed inhibited its ability to fulfill all 
the roles of the various audiences looking to it for assistance. 
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Chapter 2  The Theory of Roles 
 Conflicts occur every day resulting from many causes.  One cause is the lack of 
understanding of a designated role within a social system.  Every day people and 
organizations fulfill a number of roles.  To understand an organization’s role, one can 
examine their mission statement.  According to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
the primary mission of the DHS is to: (A) prevent terrorist attacks within 
the U.S.; (B) reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. to terrorism; (C) 
minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that 
do occur within the U.S.; (D) carry out all functions of entities transferred 
to the DHS including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and 
manmade crises and emergency planning; (E) ensure that the functions of 
the agencies and subdivisions within the DHS that are not related directly 
to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a 
specific explicit Act of Congress; (F) ensure that the overall economic 
security of the U.S. is not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs 
aimed at securing the homeland; and (G) monitor connections between 
illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such 
connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug 
trafficking (P.L. 107-296). 
 
As noted in this mission the twenty-two agencies that combined to form the DHS already 
had established roles within the government.  No one government agency merged into the 
DHS had as its primary mission to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.  That was one 
of the reasons that Congress created the DHS.  However by combining these various 
agencies into a new environment the role that those agencies were filling was altered, as a 
result of this conflict arose within these agencies.  According to Banton (1965), a “role” 
can be defined as a set of norms or expectations applied to the incumbent of a particular 
position. However, how roles are defined depends upon the audience defining the 
expectations for a position and how much consensus there is between those defining the 
role.  Roles also depend upon the social system within which they are defined.  Conflict 
results from unclear expectations for the role, too many expectations for a role occupant, 
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and contradictory expectations for a role.  This chapter will provide an overview of role 
theory, the basic concepts of role theory, the expectations of the DHS, and how mission 
statements outline expectations of an organization.      
Overview  
 Biddle and Thomas (1966) state that the “role analyst is concerned with 
describing and understanding many of the same complex aspects of human behavior 
about which dramatists, novelists, journalists, and historians write.”  Role theorists have 
examined individuals in various social systems to try and gain a better understanding 
about why people act as they do.  Role theory is not one grand theory (Biddle and 
Thomas, 1966; Preiss and Ehrlich, 1966), however, it cannot be rejected outright because 
the problems of role theory are inexplicably bound to the general problems of sociology 
and social psychology (Preiss and Ehrlich, 1966).  To truly understand role theory, one 
must first dissect what a role is. 
 The literature does not reach a consensus as to the definition of role theory.  
Holsti (1977) outlines the fact that there is no one overarching definition because 
“scholars tend to define the term to suit their research needs.  Since the concept of role is 
used at so many different levels of analysis – from exploration of a group of children 
learning to conform to the expectations of their elders, to theories of society – it is little 
wonder that a universal meaning of the term has not yet been developed.”  Most role 
theorists believe that a role is the manifestation of a persons behavior influenced by the 
expectations of others in specific contexts (Gross, Mason, & McEachern, 1966; Biddle & 
Thomas, 1966; Biddle, 1986; Campbell, 1999; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Seo & Hill, 2005).  
The expectations that people assume for various roles are learned through experience, 
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culture, and the social systems within which people interact.  Therefore, people come to 
understand how to enact specific roles by observation, learning, and interaction with 
others in social systems.  They must learn the culture of an organization e.g. ‘this is how 
we do things around here’ and the other unspoken nuances of how a given organization 
operates.  However, according to Nicholson (1984), role development varies according to 
the constraints and opportunities of the needs and expectations of the person fulfilling 
that role.  Each role will be altered slightly by the person who is assuming it, and the 
same roles will not be identical because each role involves a different person thus making 
it unique.     
The other component of this definition is the fact that these roles are fulfilled 
within a social system.  The type of social system is a matter of debate in and of itself and 
often depends on which sub-field of role theory one consults.  Over time five main 
perspectives of role theory have emerged; organizational, functional, symbolic 
interactionist, structural, and cognitive.  One of the most prevalent and researched 
perspectives is organizational.  Organizational role theorists have built “a version of role 
theory focused on social systems that are preplanned, task-oriented, and hierarchical” 
(Biddle, 1986).  “Organizational role theory proposes that individuals in organizations 
occupy positions or roles which involve a set of activities, including interactions with 
others, that are required or expected as part of the job” (Karakowsky and McBey, 1999).  
In this area of role theory, roles are influenced by the organization, the individuals within 
that organization, and informal groups that permeate the organization.   
Functional role theory focuses on the characteristic behaviors of persons who 
occupy social positions within a stable social system (Biddle, 1986; Campbell, 1999).  In 
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this sub-field roles arise from normative expectations about a function in society and 
individuals are socialized into a role (Guirguis and Chewning, 2005).  However, there are 
a number of criticisms surrounding this concept of roles especially because not all roles 
are identified with social positions.  Furthermore, social systems are hardly stable, and all 
roles contained therein are not necessarily associated with function (Biddle, 1986).       
Symbolic interactionist role theory stresses the roles of individual actors, the 
evolution of roles through social interaction, and various cognitive concepts through 
which social actors understand and interpret their own conduct (Sarbin & Allen, 1954; 
Zurcher, 1983; Biddle, 1986; Campbell, 1999).  In this school of thought little attention is 
given to the expectations that people have for the person occupying said role.  
Researchers in this field focus on the individual and how the role and individual interact.   
The effects that each has upon the other as well as how diverse individuals in different 
roles interact with other people in their roles.     
Structural role theory “represents a systems approach to a group-task situation and 
proceeds from the assumption that an account of the structure of the system must precede 
an effective study of its processes or dynamics” (Kabanoff, 1988).  Like symbolic 
interactionist, structural role theory pays little attention to expectations, here the emphasis 
is on the social environment with less concerns about the individual within that 
environment (Campbell, 1999).  This branch of role theory utilizes mathematical symbols 
to explain social structures, which are a stable organization of individuals (Guirguis and 
Chewning, 2005).  Structural role theory does not enjoy a large following as its 
assumptions are limiting and many social scientists are not willing to accept arguments 
expressed in mathematical symbols (Biddle, 1986).     
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Cognitive role theory focuses on the relationships between role expectations and 
behavior (Biddle, 1986).  Researchers studying cognitive role theory have examined the 
ways in which a person perceives the expectations of others and the effects of those 
perceptions on behavior (Campbell, 1999).  Empirical research in this expansive 
perspective has studied role-playing, norms, anticipatory role expectations, and the 
effects of role taking on behavior.  Criticisms of this theory are that it tends to focus on 
the individual, fails to account for the impact of environment, and tends to ignore the 
evolution of roles (Guirguis and Chewning, 2005).  The five branches of role theory 
overlap and each has utilized some basic concepts to understand the problems associated 
with role theory and the obstacles people face in the roles that they occupy.    
Basic Concepts 
 Consensus is an important basic concept to role theory.  Consensus is the degree 
to which agreement of the expectations for a role exists by those defining the role.  
According to Gross, et al (1958), the degree of consensus among role definers is an 
important variable in how roles are filled.  Just as there is never a complete absence of 
consensus, there can never be a complete presence of consensus since roles are defined 
by multiple groups and it is rare that multiple groups of people will agree (Preiss and 
Ehrlich, 1966; Gross et al, 1958; Biddle, Rosencranz, Tomich, and Twyman, 1966).  
However, consensus can be affected by a number of factors, one being the size of the 
organization.  The smaller the organization the more likely consensus will exist (Thomas, 
1966).  The number of role definers also has a bearing on consensus.  The less role 
definers there are the more likely there will be consensus among them regarding how a 
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person should perform in a particular role.  In the majority of situations, roles are defined 
upon a continuum.   
 Role conflict occurs when people are charged with a role for which there is no 
consensus.  Role conflict is any situation in which the incumbent of a focal position 
perceives that there are incompatible expectations (Gross et al, 1958; Sarbin and Allen, 
1954; Kahn et al, 1964; Shenkar and Zeira, 1992; Floyd and Lane, 2000).  Some 
researchers studying role conflict have examined the various types of role conflict, and 
whether the conflict exists within the role itself or rests instead in the person that is 
holding two roles simultaneously.  Most researchers examine role conflict and the 
ramifications it has on social systems from the context of people who assume a given 
role.  Jackson and Schuler (1985) found role conflict to be negatively associated with six 
different aspects of job satisfaction and positively associated with tension, anxiety, 
propensity to leave the organization, and individual productivity.  Floyd and Lane (2000) 
point out that when individuals interact within well-defined roles, their interactions 
become more predictable, which in turn increases ones level of trust in an organization.  
Therefore, roles, which are not clear and explicit, create interactions that are less 
predictable and the trust needed to facilitate exchanges within the group is more difficult 
to develop.  There is a debate about whether role conflict is the result of contradictory 
expectations.  According to Preiss and Ehrlich “contradictory expectations cannot be 
fulfilled, but all of the expectations can be ignored” (1966).  Gross et al (1958) had 
similar findings in their research begging the question; if the occupant of the role does 
not believe the expectations of said role to be incompatible, then does the conflict truly 
exist? 
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Of course not all situations have contradictory expectations; sometimes there is a 
lack of information regarding expectations for a role.  This is known as role ambiguity.  
A number of factors cause role ambiguity including: organizational complexity, rapid 
organizational change, and current managerial philosophies (Kahn et al, 1964).  Role 
ambiguity can also be seen as employees’ perceptions of uncertainty concerning various 
aspects of their job (Breaugh and Colihan, 1994).  Kahn et al, outlined that the ambiguity 
was caused when not only expectations were unclear, but also priorities, behaviors and 
performance levels as well.  Role ambiguity interferes with goal accomplishment by 
employees, which in turn affects mission accomplishment by the organization. 
Another concept examined within role theory is that of role overload.  Role 
overload occurs when a person is faced with too many expectations (Biddle, 1986).  Not 
only too many expectations, but also too many roles.  Finding a balance between roles 
and the expectations of overlapping roles can be quite stressful.  Being unable to perform 
a role due to lack of skill or because the occupant’s personal values differ with other 
expectations for a certain role may have a similar effect as role conflict, role ambiguity, 
and role overload.  All of these issues may occur for a role occupant, and most are seen to 
have negative effects on the role occupant.  However, this is not always the case.                  
With role overload, as one obtains more roles they also obtain more rights.  While 
some of these roles may cause conflict with each other, some actually complement the 
existing roles that a given person holds.  This is known as role accumulation.  For 
example, a person may join a professional organization in order to gain networking 
opportunities.  After being a member for a period of time they may decide that their 
career would be better served if they were in a position on the board.  This new role is 
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acquired to further a role that the person already occupies.  Sieber (1974) outlines four 
positive outcomes from role accumulation, such as the aforementioned example.  The 
first outcome of role accumulation is role privileges.  “Privileges are part and parcel of 
almost every social role, if those privileges are not endorsed, then the person occupying 
that role may renounce his responsibilities and even displace the person occupying that 
role by force.  Thus, while revolutionaries might protest the inadequacy of past rewards 
for services rendered, their most stirring appeal to revolt is ordinarily couched in terms or 
rights rather than in terms of rewards for past performance” (Sieber, 1974).   
The second outcome of role accumulation is overall status security, which is 
typically created by buffer roles.  “The accumulation of buffers might be especially 
critical for individuals who engage in ventures of some risk.  They are also of value to 
stationary individuals who fear or anticipate ego stress as a consequence of unpredictable 
or uncontrollable changes in a given role relationship” (Sieber, 1974).  The third outcome 
of role accumulation is resources for status enhancement and role performance.  Role 
accumulation is a common avenue for enhancing one’s power base in society (Sieber, 
1974).  The fourth outcome is personality enrichment and ego gratification.  “It is 
possible to imagine situations in which role overload and conflict produce a good deal of 
ego-gratification, namely, the sense of being appreciated or needed by diverse role 
partners” (Sieber, 1974).  Albeit, the accumulation of additional roles and expectations 
will not always be positive, but conversely this process does not always lead to conflict 
either.  If a role occupant is in conflict however, there are ways to decrease or remove 
said conflict.   
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Resolving Role Conflict 
 Walker and Simon (1987) discovered four ways to resolve role conflict: merger, 
altercast, interpenetration of roles, and alternation.  A role occupant can choose to merge 
two roles together.  To altercast, a person responds to role expectations with a behavior 
that reorients the target’s role expectations.  To interpenetrate roles one takes the 
expectations for a specific role and diffuses them throughout the other roles, which they 
currently occupy.  The last resolution is to alternate between the roles.  All of these 
solutions are prevalent in American society today where people are constantly multi-
tasking everyday and typically trying to fulfill a number of role expectations 
simultaneously.   
 If these solutions do not work however, there are three factors that one should 
examine when attempting to discern the allocation of time and energy among roles: the 
individual norm commitment, the established reward or punishment by role parties, and 
the reactions of the third party or audience (Sarbin and Allen, 1954).  These are not so 
much ways to resolve role conflict, but ways to help the person in conflict decide which 
role to activate.  Some roles may need to be changed to fit the conflicting expectations.  
Zurcher (1983) believes this may be appropriate “when the social systems that support 
the role occupants usual roles are rendered inoperative, individuals autonomously can 
find ways to make new roles.  Those creations not only help the innovators maintain their 
self-concepts and sense of competence, but facilitate the rebuilding of the social status 
quo ante.”   
Another solution to role conflict is to seek clarification from the source of the 
conflict (Preiss and Ehrlich, 1966).  However, this cannot be accomplished in every 
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situation.   When a person cannot confront their audience another solution might be to 
develop scenarios for how actions within that role might be perceived by the audience for 
that role.  With most roles, individuals not only understand what is expected of us, but we 
also internalize assumptions regarding how others conduct themselves in similar social 
systems.  From these assumptions it is typical to derive scenarios as to how events are 
likely to develop, then conform to these expectations or exercise the flexibilities in the 
role in order to best react to future conflicts.      
Role scenarios are not only central to decision making, they also tend to manage 
how we frame our choices.  Scenarios reflect the comprehension attached to any role of 
how a given system functions–its goals, procedures, cultural premises, capabilities, and 
historical patterns-both in general terms and with regard to specific issues (Rosenau, 
1987).  However, one problem with scenarios is that they can typically only be broken 
down into a few decisions, after which they become too complex to be comprehended.  
Rosenau (1987) argues that role scenarios for governments are more complex than 
everyday people enacting roles and help to explain why politicians are so readily the 
subject of criticism.  “The problems associated with elaborating role scenarios also serve 
to explain why makers of foreign policy in democratic politics are so readily subject to 
criticism.  If they are cautious and confine their scenarios to only a few segments, they 
may be charged with being unimaginative and victims of bureaucratic inertia.  If they 
offer clear-cut scenarios that elaborate many segments across long stretches of time, they 
may be seen as ideologues with tunnel vision.” 
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Expectations for DHS 
 The RAND Corporation (2006) conducted a nationwide survey to gather in-depth 
data about the assessment of state and local response organizations’ regarding federal 
preparedness programs for combating terrorism.  The first survey was conducted just 
prior to September 11th.  They performed follow-up surveys in 2002 and 2003.  RAND 
discovered high expectations for DHS.  The majority of organizations were expecting 
funding support from DHS.  “In addition, state and local organizations wanted more 
information about the terrorist threat and expressed a number of views on how to improve 
DHS’ Homeland Security Advisory System.  State and local governments expected DHS 
to improve coordination between federal, state and local levels, streamline grant 
processes and requirements, consolidate training courses and equipment programs, and 
finally facilitate integration of the private sector” (Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton, & 
Steinberg, 2006).  States and local governments are not just looking for money, but 
assistance with coordination issues, as well as “a clearly articulated vision from the DHS 
for how money should be spent” (Khademian, 2004).   
 “Reports by the GAO and DHS’ Office of Inspector General, as well as by the 
House Homeland Security Committee, have identified the need for clear national 
guidance in defining the appropriate level of preparedness and setting priorities to 
achieve it.  The lack of such guidance has in the past been identified as hindering state 
and local efforts to prioritize their needs and plan how best to allocate their homeland 
security funding” (Jenkins, 2005).    No clear definition of homeland security existed 
prior to September 11th, which proved problematic with regards to funding. 
  27
     “In interviews with officials at more than a dozen federal agencies, we found that 
a broadly accepted definition of homeland security did not exist.  The Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) believes a single definition of homeland security can be 
used to enforce budget discipline” (Yim, 2002).  In July of 2002 the Executive branch 
released the National Strategy for Homeland Security, in which they define homeland 
security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United 
States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and 
recover from attacks that do occur.”  This definition is problematic because many of the 
agencies that were merged into DHS did not have terrorism prevention as their core 
mission.  No one agency did, thus there was confusion about the missions of the various 
agencies that were merged together to create DHS.  The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security is a good start, but   
it is vague, lacks a clear, concise plan for implementation, fails to define 
specific missions for the agencies being absorbed, and does not clarify each 
agency’s relationship to DHS.  For example, the DHS website contains links 
to agencies being absorbed; however, some of these agencies do not have a 
mission statement related to their roles in DHS, nor an acknowledgement of 
their subordination to DHS.  Uncertainty exists not only regarding the roles 
of the individual agencies, but also that of the local and state governments.  
For the department to be effective, clarification of the roles and 
responsibilities within and among the different levels of government, as well 
as the private sector, needs to take place (Mitchell & Pate, 2003). 
 
As previously stated, there were many agencies involved in doling out grants to 
the states for homeland security purposes.  The FEMA, the Office of Domestic Programs 
as part of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) were the main players; however, they were not the only agencies to 
dispense grants to states or local governments.  Some grants were made directly to cities.  
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When Colorado created an office of homeland security the administrator read a 
newspaper story about how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had a security 
grant that went directly to water treatment facilities, which he did not know before the 
article (Peckenpaugh, 2002).  A major expectation for DHS was to create a “one-stop 
shop” for grants, but states and Congress expected DHS to do more than fund training 
exercises and equipment.  They were expected to set priorities for how to spend the 
money and provide guidance to municipalities regarding what should be protected.  The 
other issue is how these expectations were relayed to DHS.  The first guidance that DHS 
was given as to what was expected was through its mission.   
Mission Statements 
 In mergers and acquisitions organizations have to create a new organizational 
identity.  To create a new identity, organizations must first create a new vision, highlight 
common goals, and create organizational symbols (Seo and Hill, 2005).  Similar to 
individuals, organizations can have multiple identities and perform multiple roles.  Just 
like in individuals these identities and roles can have negative or positive effects, similar 
to role overload.  Organizations can also experience role conflict similar to individuals.  
However, the response to manage this conflict is slightly different.  Pratt and Foreman 
(2000) examined multiple organizational identities and found four ways to resolve the 
conflict among identities: compartmentalization, deletion, integration, and aggregation.  
Organizations may be able to manage their multiple identities, but employees may still 
identify with the original organization.  In turbulent organizational environments, it is 
important to ask whether employees still identify with the original organization(s), what 
forms such identification assumes, and what factors drive identification (Rousseau, 
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1998).  In mergers and acquisitions both organizations and individuals are prone to role 
conflict.  One way to help alleviate role conflict is by developing a mission statement for 
the new organization, and working as quickly as possible to create the new organization’s 
identity.   
Mission statements outline an organization’s purpose and goals.  They are also 
intended to motivate and therefore control the behaviors of organizational members 
toward common organizational goals (Bart, Bontis, and Taggar, 2001).  When creating a 
mission statement an organization should seek to include its purpose, competitive 
distinctiveness, product/service definition, and values (Bart and Baetz, 1998).  A mission 
statement allows an organization to inform the public of what to expect from it.  
Throughout the 1990s companies around the world espoused the need for a mission 
statement.  The Government Performance and Results Act (PL 103-62) require federal 
departments and agencies to write mission statements (Weiss and Piderit, 1999).  Each 
agency within each department has a separate mission statement that should reinforce the 
overarching mission statement of the department as a whole.  Despite the discussion of 
the need for mission statements, little research has been done to investigate whether their 
existence correlates positively to performance.  
The results of a few studies to determine whether missions have a positive 
correlation on organization performance are mixed, but mostly lean towards the positive 
and the fact that missions matter (Bart, Bontis, and Taggar, 2001; Bart and Baetz, 1998; 
Weiss and Piderit, 1999).  Simply having a mission statement in and of itself will not lead 
to organizational success, but it can help.  Mission statements can give an employee a 
sense of purpose and direction as well as define the ultimate aspiration of the 
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organization.  The DHS was given the mission of leading a unified national effort to 
secure America through the prevention and deterrence of terrorist attacks all the while 
protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the nation.  While 
simultaneously ensuring safe and secure borders, welcoming lawful immigrants and 
visitors, and promoting the free-flow of commerce (DHS, Strategic Plan, 2004).  Given 
this significant mission statement, it becomes critical to examine if all of the agencies that 
were combined to create DHS help to fulfill this mission while balancing their pre-
existing responsibilities before being absorbed by DHS. 
In Sum 
 When expectations are not clear for individuals they experience role conflict.  
When there is a lack of information about expectations for a role the result is role 
ambiguity.  There is a negative correlation between role conflict, role ambiguity and job 
satisfaction.  There is a positive correlation between role conflict, role ambiguity and 
tension, anxiety, and a lack of individual productivity.  Individuals who enact well-
defined roles develop more trust in an organization because their actions become more 
predictable.  Role ambiguity is caused by organizational complexity, rapid organizational 
change, and managerial philosophies.  When organizations change rapidly employees can 
be faced with too many expectations.  The result of this is role overload.  Role overload 
has both negative and positive effects on the role holder.   
 If an organization that has gone through a merger or acquisition has multiple 
organizational identities employees may identify with the original identity and not the 
new one.   Mission statements are one way that new organizations create a unified 
organizational identity, which outline the purpose and goal of the organization.  Mission 
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statements also convey to the pubic what to expect from the organization.  DHS was 
given a large mission to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks, work to prevent new 
attacks, all the while maintaining their previous missions, and responsibilities.   
 DHS had to take multiple organizational identities, numerous overlapping roles, 
and a myriad of expectations from a number of audiences and merge them into a cohesive 
and fully functioning organization within four months.  Many of the agencies merged into 
DHS had mission overlap, assumed new roles, and had their mission changed.  
Examining all the mission statements of the agencies merged into DHS one will see what 
new roles they were given, the expectations of the agency, and how they manage their 
new organizational identity.     
  32
Chapter 3  Mission of DHS Agencies and Directorates 
 The mission of DHS as outlined in the FY 2008 strategic plan is to lead the 
unified national effort to secure America, to prevent and deter terrorist attacks, protect 
against and respond to threats and hazards to the Nation.  All the while securing our 
national borders while welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade (DHS Strategic 
Plan, 2008).  When DHS was created the political climate was antagonistic between 
Congress and the President.  There was a race between the two in who could act first after 
September 11th and Congress beat the President in proposing a new cabinet level 
Department.  The President and his staff proposed an expansive department.  When 
working to create DHS those who were developing the proposal looked at all agencies 
(Glasser & Grunwald, 2005).  However, when the President proposed the new 
Department to this Cabinet, some began to lobby to ensure that they would not lose any 
agencies in the merger.  According to Glasser and Grunwald;  
Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson launched a 
behind-the-scenes campaign to keep a handful of offices that were 
supposed to go to DHS, including the National Disaster Medical System 
and the national drug stockpile. "Make sure this doesn't happen!" he 
instructed Jerome M. Hauer, one of his assistant secretaries. The plan had 
been put together with such speed and secrecy that after its release angry 
officials had to explain to the White House how their agencies really 
worked. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham was able to beat back the 
total transfer of Livermore after it became clear the Gang of Five (the 
aides who proposed which agencies to make the move) had little idea what 
the lab did. A similar battle unfolded over the Department of Energy's 
radiological detection teams, which were supposed to be folded in with 
FEMA. The White House had not realized that the teams consisted of 
employees with regular jobs who mobilized only during emergencies 
(2005). 
Lobbyists for the industries in which some of these agencies operated were also on 
Capitol Hill trying to explain why the agency that they work closely with should not be 
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moved into this new department.  Once it was finalized which would move and which 
would not, all parties desired the agencies to move quickly and perform their new roles as 
fast as possible and nearly perfect as well.  It was decided that some agencies needed to 
be moved to eliminate some of the mission overlap between them.  This was true in 
merging the many border agencies.  Some agencies it appears to be random in why they 
were merged, because the expectations for the agencies did not appear to be compatible 
with DHS.  A few agencies were created within the legislation that created the 
department.    
 This chapter will examine the twenty-two core agencies that were combined to 
create the DHS and the four directorates in which they were placed.  First, this study will 
discuss the four different directorates, then examining the agencies placed within each 
directorate.  It will examine whether the mission of the agency changed, if the agency 
assumed new roles or lost roles, and if there was balance between the missions.  It will 
also explore if the expectations between the DHS and the agency were compatible before 
the merger and if the expectations of what the agency would be doing within DHS were 
clear.  The last question this chapter will seek to answer is whether employees still 
identify with the previous organization and why they may still have that identification.  
Appendix A highlights the mission statements of each agency before it was merged into 
DHS and after.  To see the overall organization of the DHS shortly after it was created, 
review appendix B an organizational chart. 
The Border and Transportation Security Directorate 
 The Border and Transportation Security (BTS) directorate brought together seven 
agencies from four different departments: the U.S. Customs Service from Treasury, the 
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Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) from DOJ, the Federal Protective Service 
from the General Services Administration (GSA), the Transportation Security 
Administration from the DOT, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center from 
Department of Treasury, part of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service from US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Office for Domestic Preparedness from 
DOJ.  The mission of this directorate is preventing the entry of terrorists and instruments 
of terrorism, securing the borders and all transportation systems, administering 
immigration functions and policy and priorities.  Two main bureaus were created from 
the merger of these bureaus: the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the 
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  These two bureaus absorbed the 
Customs Service, the INS, and the portion of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service that was merged into DHS.  
Immigration and Naturalization Services   
 The Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) was moved from the DOJ.  
The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s mission is to administer and enforce the 
immigration and naturalization laws of the U.S., including securing the nation’s borders 
and apprehending illegal immigrants (Federal Service Impasses Panel, 2001).  INS’ 
mission is twofold; prevent illegal immigrants from entering the country while updating 
the status of legal non-US citizens and prevent the employment of individuals ineligible 
for admission (DOJ, OIG, 2001).  Thus INS’ mission is one part enforcement and one 
part service.  Upon its transfer into DHS, the Immigration and Naturalization Services 
(INS) was abolished.  The adjudication portion of INS’ mission was transferred to the 
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration while the statistical branch of the Office of Policy 
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and Programs was transferred to the Under Secretary for Management.  The INS 
function, which dealt with unaccompanied children, was transferred to the Director of the 
Office of Refugee Resettlement of HHS (P.L 106-313, 2000).  Immigration officers who 
specialized in inspection, examination, adjudication, legalization, investigation, patrol, 
and refugee and asylum issues were combined with the U.S. Customs Service into the 
U.S Customs and Border Protection.  Legacy INS employees now work in one of three 
agencies: the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Service, the Bureau of Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (P.L 106-
313, 2000). 
 The mission of the INS was not changed out right, however it was altered.  This 
agency did not assume any new roles or lose any; however they separated the employees 
who performed the two roles within this agency.  The expectations for INS were clear 
because they were still performing their old roles, just in different departments.  The 
expectations between DHS and INS were compatible.  INS’ role was to prevent illegal 
immigrants from entering the country and the expectation of DHS was to keep terrorists 
from entering the country.  There was balance between the roles because all of the roles 
were separated and the agency did not assume new roles.    
 Due to the fact that the Immigration and Naturalization Services was dissolved 
and moved, employees would have to learn to identify with their new organization that 
may or may not be within DHS.  Some of these employees were moved to HHS.  While 
employee’s jobs did not change, learning a new organizational identity could lead to role 
ambiguity.  Establishing an identity and establishing a new organization culture could 
also lead to conflict.  Organizational complexity can lead to role ambiguity and learning a 
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new organizational culture and new ways to operate within the new organization would 
lead to role ambiguity.  Employees not only had to learn a new organizational culture, but 
also to work with other agencies that they previously may have been competitive with.  
U.S. Customs Service 
 When Customs was transferred into DHS it became one of the backbones of the 
Border and Transportation Security Directorate.  It was separated into two agencies; one 
part combined Customs agents with Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents 
to form the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency, and the 
other piece of the agency combined Customs agents with the Border Patrol to form the 
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP).  The mission of the Customs service 
did not change greatly when it was transferred; however the new bureaus missions were 
slightly different and could contribute to role conflict within the Customs employees.  
According, to Richard L Skinner, the Assistant IG, in testimony to Congress (2005) the 
new mission and focus of CBP is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering 
the U.S. while also facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel (6).  This keeps the 
current Customs agents who are located at the border or other points of entry in similar 
positions.   
The focus of Immigration and Customs Enforcement is on “enforcement activities 
related to criminal and administrative violations of the immigration and customs laws of 
the U.S., regardless of where the violation occurs” (Skinner, 2005).  Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement being the investigative arm of the Border and Transportation 
directorate allows employees with a specialized focus a clearer mission that could 
actually alleviate role conflict.  However, other issues result from splitting an 
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organization in two and accordingly conflict may result from combining all these of 
agencies together.  Secretary Ridge highlighted this concern in a speech to INS 
employees in 2003.  “One of our first goals for the department this year is to integrate old 
functions in a new way, to make us stronger and safer.  We will take our border entities - 
Customs, INS, Border patrol, and our Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service - and 
merge them into one unified, coordinated force at the border” (Ridge, 2003).  Hoping to 
remove mission overlap between Customs with Immigration and Naturalization Services 
and the Border Patrol, Customs was split and then absorbed by new bureaus within the 
DHS in the hopes to give them greater focus.   
 This agency did have its mission changed for some employees.  This agency 
gained and lost some roles that they were previously performing.  Before merging with 
the DHS the expectations for Customs were compatible with the DHS and they were 
clear.  The DHS and Customs shared common goals for facilitating the flow of legitimate 
trade and enforcing the Custom laws.  Employees in this agency may still identify with 
the previous agency, however because they split the employees along functional lines that 
should lessen that aspect of conflict.  There appears to be a balance to the new roles that 
the employees who remained working on Customs issues gained.    
 As stated previously, the Customs agency was one of the main agencies that the 
Border and Transportation Security Directorate was built around.  It was separated into 
two new bureaus along with the Border Patrol and Immigration and Naturalization 
Services. While agencies would have worked together previously, each had their own 
culture and way of operating.  The merger would require them to leave that behind and 
work together to develop a new organizational culture and identity.  Employees would 
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need to create a new organizational identity, which could contribute to role conflict.  This 
rapid organizational change would lead to role ambiguity.  While, the clearer mission of 
the new bureau may help to alleviate role conflict and may lessen role ambiguity, the 
contributing factors to both of these are so strong it would take time for these effects to 
take place.   
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
 The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) Agricultural 
Quarantine Inspection (AQI), was transferred into the Border and Transportation Security 
directorate from the USDA.  The APHIS Agricultural Quarantine Inspection has a very 
specialized mission within the DHS.  The AQI program examines cargo and passengers 
entering into the U.S to ensure that there are no agricultural health threats contained 
within.  Although most Agricultural Quarantine Inspections staff were reassigned to the 
DHS, the USDA retained responsibility for promulgating regulations related to the entry 
of passengers and commodities into the U.S, according to Under Secretary William 
Hawks (3, 2003).  The USDA also retained the responsibility of collecting the user fees 
associated with inspections, with the understanding that fee collection was to be 
gradually handed over to the DHS.  The USDA and the DHS had to create a 
memorandum of agreement concerning the transfer of fees and how the two Departments 
would work together to ensure that Agricultural Quarantine Inspection did not forgo new 
regulations set in place by the USDA or training also conducted by the USDA.  The fact 
that the Agriculture Quarantine Inspection had to essentially solicit information for how 
to perform its job from two departments is one cause for role conflict.  Having to receive 
information on job performance from the USDA instead of the DHS chain of command 
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would be confusing.  As a result of this, the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection 
employees are unsure where to turn when faced with problems or questions the USDA or 
the DHS. 
 The mission of this agency did not change fundamentally.  They did not acquire 
new roles.  The expectations for this agency were compatible with the DHS as they were 
expected to keep health threats from entering the U.S at the borders.  The expectations 
when they joined the DHS were not clear however.  It was unclear who would set their 
expectations: the DHS or the USDA.  The majority of the Agricultural Quarantine 
Inspection staff was absorbed into the DHS, however the USDA retained the information 
that they needed to perform their jobs.  Due to this, the AQI staff would experience role 
ambiguity and possibly role conflict.  The expectations of their role at the border would 
come from the DHS, but expectations on how to perform their jobs would come from the 
USDA.  It is likely that many of these employees still identified with their previous 
organization because they had to rely on the USDA for training and the regulations under 
which they operated.  There was balance between roles, but not a balance between 
administrative roles and who was performing them the USDA or the DHS.   
 Another area of conflict is over the collection of fees.  The USDA collects the 
fees and then pays them back to the DHS.  This money is utilized by the DHS for AQI 
staff; however there is a conflict over the collection of the fees and transferring them to 
the DHS.  This adds to the stress that staff already is experiencing from becoming 
employees of the DHS.   
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Office of Domestic Preparedness 
 The DHS was created to streamline the grants process.  The intent of Congress 
was to distribute money faster to the states by only dealing with one Department.  
However, not all programs that dealt with first responder grants were transferred into the 
DHS.  The main programs from the Office of Domestic Preparedness and FEMA were 
transferred to the DHS.  The Office of Domestic Preparedness was first given the 
authority to administer grants to local responders in FY 1998.  At that time only forty-one 
counties and local jurisdictions received funding (DHS, Office of Grants & Training, 
2008).  The Office of Domestic Preparedness’ mission was “to develop and implement a 
national program to enhance the capability of state and local agencies to respond to 
domestic terrorism” (DOJ Inspector General, 2002).  While a part of the Department of 
Justice, the Office of Domestic Preparedness was broken into five functional areas.  The 
divisions were set-up to work with the various municipalities and assist them in 
developing three-year statewide preparedness plans as well as administer equipment 
grants, training grants, and a training center.  Through January 15, 2002, the Office of 
Domestic Preparedness awarded grants totaling about $149 million — $101.7 million to 
257 grantees for equipment and $47.1 million to 29 grantees for training (DOJ, OIG, 
2002).   
 According to a DOJ, Inspector General’s audit the Office of Domestic 
Preparedness was not fulfilling its mission.  “As of January 15, 2002, over $141 million 
of the $243 million in funds appropriated for equipment from FY 1998 through FY 2001 
had not been awarded. Furthermore, about $65 million in grant funds awarded to grantees 
was unspent. Also, nearly $1 million in equipment purchased by the grantees was 
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unavailable for use because grantees did not properly distribute the equipment, could not 
locate it, or had been inadequately trained on how to operate it” (DOJ, OIG, 2002).  In 
some cases grants were disbursed as fast as seven months, in other cases it took as long as 
twenty-nine months.  There were a number of reasons for the delays, some on the part of 
the grant recipients, but the main reason was that states did not fulfill a prerequisite set by 
Congress; a completed domestic preparedness plan.  Some plans were not completed 
because the Office of Domestic Preparedness did not set a deadline for when the plans 
should be submitted (DOJ, OIG, 2002).   
After the disaster of September 11th Congress appropriated more money to assist 
states in becoming more prepared.  The FY 2002 State Domestic Preparedness Program 
focused on responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  To be eligible for these 
funds states must have submitted and had approved their needs assessment as well as 
their domestic preparedness strategy.  States could utilize these funds for equipment, 
exercises, and a small amount for administrative purposes.  Total funding amounted to 
$315 million for the grant cycle.   
 In FY 2003 grants for first responders grew exponentially, so did the 
responsibilities of the Office of Domestic Preparedness.  The Office of Domestic 
Preparedness was placed within the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security.  
Its responsibilities grew from assisting states with developing and implementing their 
strategic preparedness plans, administering equipment and training grants, and providing 
training to: coordinating preparedness efforts at the Federal level and working with all 
level of governments to on all matters pertaining to combating terrorism; coordinating 
communications relating to homeland security at all levels of government; direct and 
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supervise preparedness grant programs of the Federal government; providing training for 
the DHS agents; serve as the lead executive branch agency for preparedness for acts of 
terrorism, cooperating closely with FEMA; assist in conducting risk analysts and risk 
management activities at all levels of government; and those elements of the Office of 
National Preparedness (ONP) of FEMA which relate to terrorism, which shall be 
consolidated within DHS in Office of Domestic Preparedness established under this 
section (P.L 107-296, 2002).  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also required Office of 
Domestic Preparedness to retain its functions from DOJ under the same terms, 
conditions, policies, and authorities, with the required level of personnel, assets and 
budget from before September 11th for FY 2003 and FY 2004 (P.L 107-269, 2002).   
 Kenneth Burris Jr., Region IV Director of FEMA, testified to Congress that 
Office of National Preparedness’ mission is “to provide leadership in the coordination 
and facilitation of all Federal efforts to assist State and local first responders (including 
fire, medical and law enforcement) and emergency management organizations with 
planning, training, equipment and exercises necessary to build and sustain capability to 
respond to any emergency or disaster, including a terrorist incident involving a weapon of 
mass destruction and other natural or manmade hazards” (2002).  The Office of National 
Preparedness was divided into four divisions: the administration division; the program 
coordination division; the technological services division; and the assessment and 
exercise division (Burris, 2002).  Only the program coordination division, which is 
related to terrorism, was transferred into the Office of Domestic Preparedness within 
DHS.  The rest of Office of National Preparedness’ responsibilities remained in FEMA.   
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 Congress was trying to streamline this office because there was overlap between 
the Office of Domestic Preparedness and FEMA in many ways.  The first overlap 
between FEMA and Office of Domestic Preparedness was grant management.  When 
DHS was formed a new office was created to manage grants.  This office was the Office 
of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP).  The SLGCP 
consolidated staff from three offices; the Office of Domestic Preparedness, the Office of 
National Preparedness, and FEMA’s grant management office.  The three offices that 
formed the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness were 
now the “federal government’s lead agency responsible for preparing the nation against 
terrorism by assisting states, local and tribal jurisdictions, and regional authorities as they 
prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist acts by providing an array of assistance to 
America’s first responders through funding, coordinated training, exercises, equipment 
acquisition, and technical assistance” (ODP Fact Sheet). This new office had to merge 
these three offices in name only.  All three offices remained in their previous locations, 
because there was no main office location for DHS when it was created.  A change of 
physical location is one way to help staff create a new organizational identity.  Without 
helping to establish a new organizational identity employees will undergo role conflict 
because they are still physically located in the other organization and still feel the 
emotional ties and responsibility to fulfill the expectations that the previous organization 
set, not the expectations of the new organization.   
 The Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness was 
faced with monumental expectations.  The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD) 8 set the task of establishing a national security goal, which was the first 
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expectation of the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness.  
This national security goal would enable states, local, and tribal governments to identify 
needs, establish priorities in regards to homeland security, and have a reference with 
which to compare their current capabilities (HSPD-8, 2003).  Congress also expected the 
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness to get grants out 
quickly to the states, monitor how well they were spending the grant money, and be a 
resource for state and local governments by answering questions in regards to grant 
funding.  As stated previously, the Office of Domestic Preparedness had difficulty 
performing those tasks when they were within the DOJ and they did not have to contend 
with a merger.  DHS received numerous complaints in regards to its handling of the grant 
administration because none of the previous problems from the Office of Domestic 
Preparedness were cleared up.  If anything they were made worse when Congress passed 
the Patriot Act of 2001, which required DHS to grant money to the states via a formula. 
The USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 states “each State shall be allocated in each 
fiscal year under this section not less than 0.75 percent of the total amount appropriated 
in the fiscal year for grants pursuant to this section, except that the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
America Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands each shall be allocated 0.25 
percent” (P.L. 107-56).  The rest of the funds were to be disbursed and allocated at the 
Secretary’s discretion.  Secretary Ridge decided to allocate the grants on the basis of 
population.  This led to smaller states receiving more funding than larger states.  Funding 
did not go out as quickly as Congress had hoped, and there was still confusion on what 
could be funded and what the need was.  Most states wanted the money to pay their first 
responders salaries and other administrative costs, however the grants were not allowed 
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to be utilized for that purpose and again a lot of the money was not drawn down or 
utilized by the localities as intended.  DHS also relied upon the DOJ Office of the 
Comptroller for grant fund distribution and assistance with financial management support 
(Inspector General Berman, 2005).   
 As laid out above, the main expectation of the Office of State and Local 
Government Coordination and Preparedness was to set a national security goal that was 
in sync with the expectation of managing the first responder grants efficiently.  The 
expectation that leads to role conflict within this agency is the expectation that the grants 
would be distributed according to a formula.  In Congressional testimony, Dr. Veronique 
de Rugy outlines the problem to be that forty percent of the total grants are divided up 
equally among all states (2005).  In his haste to distribute the grants quickly Secretary 
Ridge determined that the other sixty percent be distributed based upon population 
because to distribute the grants on the basis of risk would require time to perform a risk 
assessment of all critical infrastructure within each of the states and US territories that 
were eligible for funding.  The expectation to get grants out quickly and fairly to all states 
regardless of where they were located led to considerable conflict within the Office of 
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, which it is still working to 
resolve.  
 Another obstruction in Office of Domestic Preparedness’ transformation into the 
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness was its placement 
into the Border and Transportation Security directorate.  Other preparedness programs 
were placed within the Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate.  The Inspector 
General highlighted this issue in its Semiannual Report to the Congress on April 30, 
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2003; “this bifurcation will create additional challenges related to inter-departmental 
coordination, performance accountability, and fiscal accountability.”   
 The Office of Domestic Preparedness underwent a tremendous amount of changes 
while DHS was establishing itself.  The mission of the office did not change, however 
they did acquire new roles.  These roles were complementary with the roles that they 
were already fulfilling though.  However, there was not balance between the roles as 
states wanted more assistance on the administrative tasks associated with grants and this 
office was focused more on trying to get the funds out.  This office also had high 
expectations placed on it, when it was transferred from DOJ.  These expectations were 
compatible with the DHS and the relationship was clear before the merger.  The 
expectations to have funds quickly disbursed to the states to help them prepare for 
another terrorist attack came down to how well this office was organized and set-up.  
There were divergent expectations between audiences.   
 The states wanted money to pay their first responders and Congress wrote the 
legislation as such that that was not possible.  All audiences agreed that they wanted their 
grants to be allocated and disbursed quickly.  However, while at the DOJ the Office of 
Domestic Preparedness had problems fulfilling its mandate of getting money to the states 
quickly, it had an even more difficult time once it moved to DHS because of the 
additional complications associated with merging with another office; the program 
coordination division of FEMA.  This consolidation did nothing to relieve the problems 
that the original offices were experiencing.  If anything it made them worse because now 
the new office had to deal with both offices organizational problems and try to fulfill the 
mandate from Congress to disburse funds quickly.     
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 This office underwent constant change since it has merged into DHS.  Not only 
was it combined with the program coordination division on FEMA when it was first 
transferred into DHS, but it was also transferred into the Border and Transportation 
directorate.  The placement in this directorate separate from FEMA, which was in the 
Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate is awkward and can lead to role 
conflict because this office’s mission is to assist states and local governments prepare for 
emergencies and their response to them not deal with the border or transportation 
security.  In 2005 the Office of Domestic Programs was moved again, into the 
Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate, merged with a number of other 
offices, renamed once again to the Office of Grants and Training and oversight was given 
to FEMA.  All of this change, along with the reliance on the DOJ to disburse the needed 
funds in the beginning, and the high expectations would contribute to role conflict among 
the employees in this office.  This office has been working diligently to get information 
out to the states to alleviate some of the pressure placed on it in the beginning.     
Federal Protective Services 
   The Federal Protective Services (FPS) mission did not change fundamentally 
when it was transferred from the Government Services Agency (GSA) into the Border 
and Transportation Directorate, though it was expanded.  Robert Peck, Commissioner of 
the Federal Protective Services relayed to the Senate that “the principal mission is 
building security, by which we mean protecting the affected facility, its tenants, visitors, 
and their property from harm” (2000).  Within DHS the Federal Protective Services still 
provides security services for federally owned and leased facilities; however the 
organization has seen its responsibilities sizably grow since the merger.  The Federal 
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Protective Services was tasked with assuming increased responsibilities alongside 
Immigration and Naturalization Service agents and other custom agents.   
DHS issued a fact sheet in January 2003 highlighting the reorganization of the 
border security.  The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) “will bring 
together the enforcement and investigative arms of the Customs Service, the investigative 
and enforcement functions of Immigration and Naturalization Services and the Federal 
Protective Services. The reorganization involves approximately 14,000 employees, 
including 5,500 criminal investigators, 4,000 employees for immigration and deportation 
services and 1,500 Federal Protective Services personnel that will focus on the mission of 
enforcing the full range of immigration and customs laws within the interior of the United 
States in addition to protecting specified federal buildings” (DHS, Border Reorg Fact 
Sheet, 2003).  However, contract guards perform most security services for federal 
buildings.  The Government Services Agency collects fees for providing these services to 
federal buildings, manages the contracts, and provides training to those within federally 
owned and leased buildings.  A major complication for the changes with the Federal 
Protective Services was transferring the responsibilities of contract management.  The 
new responsibilities of the Federal Protective Services are not laid out clearly.  This may 
leave staff wondering how they exactly fit into the new organization, and can contribute 
to role conflict. 
 The mission of this agency did not change.  It did however assume new roles.  
The expectations of this agency with DHS were not overtly compatible before its 
placement within DHS.  They did share the common goal of protecting government 
buildings, however the goal of enforcing immigration and custom laws do not fit with 
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their previous goals.  The relationship between the FPS and DHS was not clear before the 
merger.   
 Due to the fact that the Federal Protective Services had to rely on both the 
Government Services Agency and DHS to understand their expectations for their new 
roles, role ambiguity would be rife within the organization.  The new responsibilities 
were not clear and how to balance the missions was not clear.  How would people trained 
to protect government buildings now enforce immigration and customs laws?  Role 
conflict would result from the new responsibilities that are incompatible with the 
previous expectations of building protection.   FPS employees would have to learn all the 
customs and immigration laws while maintaining the protection of federal buildings.  Part 
of the law that established DHS mandated that the Government Service Agency and DHS 
establish an memorandum of understanding about the transfer of contract management 
responsibilities as well as training responsibilities, therefore employees of the Federal 
Protective Services would also have to learn the complicated contract management tasks 
and other administrative tasks.  The additions of the new roles would be contributors to 
role overload.  These are complicated new tasks added to this organization.    
Transportation Security Agency  
 The Transportation Security Agency (TSA) did not exist until the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act of 2001 became law shortly after September 11th.  Within the 
Department of Transportation, the Transportation Security Agency was responsible for 
“civil aviation security, and related research and development activities; security 
responsibilities over other modes of transportation that are exercised by the DOT; and 
day-to-day Federal security screening operations for passenger air transportation” (P.L 
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107-71, 2001).  The Transportation Security Agency’s mission did not change when it 
moved to DHS.  It was still responsible for the “security of the nation’s transportation 
systems” (TSA, 2007).  When it was created, the Transportation Security Agency had the 
monumental task of hiring and training thousands of screeners.  Many employees who 
worked as screeners prior to the creation of TSA were contract employees.  The switch to 
becoming a federal employee from being a contract worker could conceivably contribute 
to role conflict.  However, the management issues, which were present within the 
Transportation Security Agency, played a larger part in the conflict when it came to 
creating a unified Department.   
 The mission of TSA did not change when it became a part of DHS because it was 
created shortly after September 11th.  Employees here did not take on new roles, however 
their role was altered slightly in that they became federal employees.  The expectations 
for TSA employees did not change when they became a part of the DHS and were clearly 
laid out.  The goals of TSA and the DHS were similar and the relationship between the 
two is clear as well.  Due to the fact that many of the employees were new employees 
they most likely did not identify with DOT.   
The alteration from contract employees to federal employees would contribute to 
role conflict because the employees would have to adapt to the new organization and 
bureaucracy that comes with being a federal employee.  However, since some of the 
employees were already contract employees they would be familiar with federal 
bureaucracy.  The employees would still have to learn their role within TSA.  TSA as a 
whole would have to work to establish administrative procedures because they were 
brand new when they were merged into the DHS.  They would have to establish these 
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quickly as they needed to hire a lot of employees to fill these new positions at the airports 
quickly.  Having this rapid organizational change could lead to role ambiguity and having 
to hire employees quickly would also lead to role conflict because so many employees 
would have to be involved in hiring these employees quickly.  The more people involved 
in the hiring process the more likely there are incompatible expectations for those 
involved.    
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
 The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) was a part of the 
Treasury before becoming a part of DHS.  The mission of the center did not change when 
it was placed in DHS.  The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center “provides career-
long law enforcement training to 81 federal partner organizations and numerous state, 
local, and international law enforcement agencies” (Skinner, (3) 2005).  Their mission is 
to train those who protect the homeland.  The goal of Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center is to provide fast, flexible, and focused training to secure and protect America, as 
well as develop uniform standards for training programs, facilities and instructors to 
ensure high caliber training across agencies (The White House, 2008).  There is very little 
role conflict within the training center because its mission has remained the same, as did 
its memorandum of understanding that was in place with various partner agencies to 
conduct training.  
 The mission of this agency did not change when it was merged into the DHS.  It 
also did not acquire any new roles or lose any roles.  The expectations for this agency 
were clear and compatible with the DHS.  The goals of this agency were also clear, as 
they did not change.  The relationship between the DHS and the agency are clear.  
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Employees in this agency most likely identified with the agency itself, not the 
Department from which it came, Treasury, as that does not appear to be the best fit.  It 
also appears that they roles that they were filling were balanced.  The only question may 
be why was this agency placed in this directorate, but this agency does train all Border 
Patrol and Customs Agents, so that may be one reason it was placed here.     
The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate 
 The Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Directorate combined five 
agencies from four departments; the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
which was previously an independent agency, the Strategic National Stockpile and the 
National Disaster Medical System from HHS, the Nuclear Incident Response Team from 
the Department of Energy, the Domestic Emergency Support Teams from DOJ, and the 
National Domestic Preparedness Office also from DOJ specifically Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI).  The agencies within this directorate oversee domestic disaster 
preparedness training and coordinate government disaster response (DHS, History Fact 
Sheet, 2007).  This directorate is different than all the others in that it contains a stockpile 
of medicine and two interagency response teams, both of which are only utilized in 
specific situations.  The main component of this directorate is FEMA. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 FEMA was the backbone of the Emergency Preparedness and Response 
directorate.  As stated previously, it was created in a similar fashion as DHS when in 
1979 President Carter took a variety of other agencies and placed them within FEMA 
(FEMA, History Fact Sheet, 2007).  The focus of FEMA at the time of creation was on 
natural and man-made disasters.  With the transfer into DHS a new focus would be 
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placed upon FEMA: response, recovery, preparation for, and mitigation of terrorism.  The 
mission of FEMA did not change from “lead America to prepare for, prevent, respond to, 
and recover from disasters” (FEMA, History Fact Sheet, 2007).  However, when FEMA 
was transferred into DHS the preparedness functions were separated from the response 
and recovery responsibilities.  There was great concern about this change.  Richard 
Skinner, DHS’ Inspector General noted in his testimony to Congress in January 2005, 
“we do have reservations about segregating FEMA’s preparedness functions from its 
response and recovery responsibilities.  Disaster preparedness, response, and recovery are 
intricately related, each relying on the other for success.”  Again, many critics believed 
that moving FEMA into DHS caused the focus on all-hazards to be lost for the focus on 
terrorism.  The mission may have remained the same, but the transfer into DHS created 
conflict because FEMA was an independent agency.   
 Another problem for FEMA was the bifurcation of grants some were moved into 
the Office of Domestic Preparedness, while a portion remained under FEMA’s purview.  
All the grants retained within FEMA were related to preparedness, and specific disasters 
and hazards.  Those specific disaster and hazard grants were only available in disasters or 
to mitigate certain hazards, such as flood insurance.  The split between the grants keeps 
expert knowledge within FEMA; however it does not fulfill the expectations for DHS to 
become a one-stop shop for all grants.  Interagency conflict between Office of Domestic 
Preparedness and FEMA can result from keeping the old system, which has Office of 
Domestic Preparedness in charge of some grants and FEMA in charge of others.  In 2005 
the preparedness grants were moved from FEMA into Office of Domestic Preparedness, 
which was named the Office of Grants and Training. 
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 In 2006 Congress passed the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations 
Act of 2007, which altered FEMA again.  According to Matt Jadacki (2007), the Deputy 
Inspector General for Disaster Assistance Oversight within DHS “these management 
reforms enhanced FEMA’s mission and role as the federal government’s disaster 
coordinator.”  Again, the stated mission of FEMA did not change; “to reduce the loss of 
life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts 
of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a 
risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, 
response, recovery, and mitigation” (P.L. 109-295).  The legislation however transferred 
all preparedness functions within DHS to FEMA and helps to strengthen their standing in 
the Department by not allowing the transfer of funds, assets, and personnel from FEMA.  
FEMA is still recovering from the problems and conflicts that originated during the 2005 
Hurricane season.  While the FY 2007 appropriations legislation helps to refocus FEMA, 
it also contributes to conflicts by giving FEMA more responsibility to coordinate between 
agencies and the federal government’s response to disasters, natural or man-made. 
 This agency had its mission altered in that terrorism was added to the 
preparedness, response, and recovery functions.  Many people pointed out that the 
addition of this new mission focus led to an imbalance of roles between a focus on 
natural disasters and man-made disasters.  During the two years since its placement into 
DHS many believe the focus of FEMA was too focused on terrorism until the 2005 
hurricane season when they turned their focus back to natural disasters.  Before being 
merged into DHS the expectations of FEMA and DHS were not explicitly compatible.  
Upon being merged into DHS they did have clear expectations in that they were to help 
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the U.S. prepare for all types of disasters.  The relationship between DHS and FEMA was 
clear when the mission was altered to include the terrorism focus.  Due to the fact that 
this agency was independent before being merged into DHS, that identity would be 
stronger for employees in this organization, which was altered only slightly when merged 
into DHS.    
 The biggest source of conflict within FEMA is the fact that it was separated into 
two areas: preparedness and response and recovery.  This bifurcation was done to help 
FEMA focus, however it could lead to role ambiguity.  In 2006, Congress changed 
FEMA again back to the way it was by remerging the preparedness functions back into 
FEMA.  However, it was not only the preparedness functions that they previously had, 
but all preparedness functions within DHS.  All of this change can lead to role ambiguity.  
Role ambiguity could also occur because there was no main DHS office, so the two 
agencies remained in the same location, but employees had to rely on two agencies for 
role clarity and expectations.  
National Domestic Preparedness Office 
 The National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) was previously part of the 
FBI.  According to Barbara Y. Martinez, Deputy Director of the National Domestic 
Preparedness Office in 1999, the office “provides a forum for the coordination of all 
federal programs that offer WMD terrorism preparedness assistance for state and local 
officials.  It is intended that the NDPO will serve as a much needed clearinghouse to 
provide information to local and state officials who must determine the preparedness 
strategy for their community.”  This office included members from FEMA, the DOD, the 
National Guard Bureau, the DOE, the HHS, the EPA, the Office of Justice Programs, the 
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FBI, the Coast Guard, the VA, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  The National 
Domestic Preparedness Office coordinates six areas: training, exercise, equipment 
research and development, information sharing, and public health and medical services 
(Martinez, 1999).   
Prior to becoming a part of DHS the National Domestic Preparedness Office was 
transferred to FEMA by President Bush.  In 2002 it was reported “the office has been 
defunct since last year and has no employees, but it never has been officially closed” 
(Peckenpaugh, 2002).  When the National Domestic Preparedness Office was moved into 
DHS it became a part of Office of Domestic Preparedness, which was split into two.  The 
part that was responsible for emergency response was under the Emergency Preparedness 
and Response Directorate.  In 2005, the National Domestic Preparedness Office was 
again transferred into the Office of Grants and Training (G&T), which combined the 
Office of Domestic Preparedness, the National Domestic Preparedness Office, and other 
grants into this office.  The Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 changed the 
National Domestic Preparedness Office once again when the Office of Grants and 
Training was integrated into FEMA.  With all of these changes taking place in this office 
there were no major changes to its role and mission, however developing an 
organizational identity would be difficult with all of the changes, and this could 
contribute to conflict for employees. 
 This office’s mission did not change when it was merged into DHS.  The office 
did not acquire or lose any roles.  The expectations were compatible with DHS, but they 
were not clear because the office was reportedly defunct in 2001.  This office and DHS 
did share common goals.  However, due to the fact that there was no dedicated staff in 
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this office, it was dependent on a variety of Departments across the government.  It is not 
clear what the relationship between this office and DHS would be.  Due to the fact that 
there was no dedicated staff they would all identify with their departments because they 
did not merge with DHS.  When integrated into DHS the National Domestic 
Preparedness Office was incorporated into the Office of Domestic Preparedness and then 
changed a number of times along with that office, if there were any employees in this 
office then they would have experienced role conflict and ambiguity as a part of the 
National Domestic Preparedness Office.    
Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical System 
 The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and the National Disaster Medical System 
(NDMS) were both transferred from the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS).  The Strategic National Stockpile is a large quantity of medicine and medical 
supplies that are utilized in an emergency if local supplies are depleted (CDC, Strategic 
National Stockpile, 2008).  The mission of the Strategic National Stockpile did not 
change and nor did the operation of the program.  According to Eric Tolbert, the Director 
of the Response Division of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate 
(2003), the only change within the Strategic National Stockpile is that the DHS is 
responsible for determining when and where the stockpile should be deployed.  The OIG 
highlighted that the biggest challenge for the Strategic National Stockpile, is that 
“responsibility for the stockpile is bifurcated and unclear” (Inspector General Ervin, 
2004).  HHS through the Center of Disease Control (CDC) maintained the management 
of the content of the stockpile.  In 2004, DHS recommended returning responsibility for 
the stockpile entirely to HHS (Inspector General Ervin, 2004).   
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The National Disaster Medical System is a system that provides support to local 
and state health agencies during natural disasters, evacuates patients throughout the US 
when the causalities cannot be managed locally, and supports the DOD and the Veterans 
Affairs (VA) medical systems during times of overseas conflict (Tolbert, 2003).  The 
purpose of the system did not change when it was transferred to DHS.  The employees of 
FEMA make up the National Disaster Medical System in an emergency.  HHS is still the 
lead agency when the National Disaster Medical System is needed, DHS is the 
coordinating agency, and DOD and the Veterans Affairs are in charge of transportation 
and logistics.  Hurricane Katrina demonstrated how the system could easily get 
overloaded.  The amount of patients moved by state, local, and private hospitals was 
enormous which resulted in some patients not being logged into the National Disaster 
Medical System and therefore were not accounted for by the Federal government 
(Franco, C., Toner, E., Waldhorn, R., Inglesby, T.V., & O’Toole, T., 2007).  During 
Hurricane Katrina the need was spread across three states and the system could not 
deploy Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT’s) fast enough to handle the medical 
needs of the states affected by the Hurricane.   
The Disaster Medical Assistance Teams are self-contained emergency teams 
comprised of thirty-five individuals who are deployed in emergency situations to stay on 
top of health care needs (S. Rep. 109-322, 2006).  These teams are organized by and 
under the authority of FEMA.  During the crisis of Hurricane Katrina the need was 
massive and spread out there was confusion about the role of FEMA.   Coordination 
broke down among the various agencies that were supposed to help the affected states.   
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 The mission of the stockpile and the medical system did not change.  They did not 
assume new roles or lose any roles.  The expectations of stockpile were clear and they 
were compatible with DHS before being merged within it.  However, the expectations of 
the medical system were not clear, but they appear to be compatible with DHS before the 
merger.  The relationship between both organizations and DHS were not clear before the 
merger because responsibility for the contents of the stockpile still lay with HHS and 
HHS was still the lead department when the medical system needed to be activated.  
 DHS and HHS were not the only Departments involved in both the system and the 
stockpile, DOD and the VA played a role in the operation of the medical system and the 
CDC managed the stockpile.  Having to respond to this many federal departments during 
a disaster could contribute to the role conflict experienced by employees because each 
department could have a different expectation of how these two systems should operate.  
It is likely that employees who worked on the stockpile would still have identified with 
HHS.  The employees who administered the medical system were FEMA employees and 
as stated previously they most likely still identified with their previous organization.   
Interagency Teams 
 The Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT) and the Domestic Emergency 
support Teams (DEST) are interagency teams that are utilized in specific incidents.  The 
Nuclear Incident Response Team is similar to the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, 
except the Nuclear Incident Response Team responds to nuclear incidents.  The Nuclear 
Incident Response Team is comprised of “those entities of the Department of Energy 
(DOE) that perform nuclear or radiological emergency support functions, radiation 
exposure functions at the medical assistance facility known as the Radiation Emergency 
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Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS), radiological assistance functions, and 
related functions, and those entities of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that 
perform such support functions and related functions” (P.L. 107-296, 2002).  The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 highlights the fact that the Secretary of Energy and the 
Administrator of the EPA still have the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, 
and utilizing their respective entities within the Nuclear Incident Response Team.  The 
DOE and EPA can also utilize the Nuclear Incident Response Team when they are not 
operating as part of DHS (P.L 107-269, 2002).  The Nuclear Incident Response Team 
may also be called to assist at other special security events.  Each event is assessed on a 
case-by-case basis and because the team is so specialized it would only be utilized when 
there is a great fear of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) attack.  
 The other interagency team is the Domestic Emergency Support Team, which was 
previously a part of the DOJ run by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).  It is an 
interagency team of experts that provide advice, guidance, and support in situations 
involving WMD or other significant domestic threats (Bea, K., Krouse, W., Morgan, D., 
Morrissey, W., & Redhead, C.S., 2003).  Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), 
created the Domestic Emergency Support Team in 1995, which stressed that “the 
Domestic Emergency Support Team shall consist only of those agencies needed to 
respond to the specific requirements of the incident.”  By the very nature of the Domestic 
Emergency Support Team there is no permanent staff at any federal agency.  However, 
when they are needed, the Secretary of DHS can call these teams together to provide 
needed guidance and support.  They have been used to respond to natural disasters in the 
past, as well as the terrorist attacks of September 11th.  By the very nature of both these 
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teams, interagency coordination is important to their function and use.  Although 
responsibility for these interagency teams has changed, they have been in operation for a 
number of years, so that should not affect their operation.     
 The mission of these two teams did not change.  They did not assume new roles 
or lose any roles.  Their expectations were compatible with DHS before the merger to 
respond to any nuclear incidents within the U.S. especially WMD attacks and the 
emergency support teams incorporate those needed for specific incidents.  The 
expectations for what DHS would be doing with the teams were not clear, as the DOE 
and EPA were still responsible for the training, organizing, and equipping the DEST.  
Also, when these teams are not being utilized they are not a part of DHS.  The only time 
that DHS would have them within their purview was when there was a nuclear disaster or 
a disaster where there is a fear that WMD are involved.  This can lead to role conflict 
between the employees of these teams when there is a disaster and they have to respond 
to DHS due to the fact that expectations for these employees is coming from two separate 
agencies.   
 For the Domestic Emergency Support Teams, however it is slightly different in 
that there is no permanent staff at any federal agency for these teams.  This team by 
nature is made up of individuals from a number of agencies needed in specific situations.  
The only cause of role conflict for employees of DHS would be understanding how to 
manage these teams and taking on the new role of overseeing these teams and ensuring 
that the right people are called up for the right situations.  Concerning both of these teams 
they would have common goals with DHS before the merger, but their relationship is not 
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overtly clear.  Due to the fact that these are interagency teams creating an organizational 
identity is not needed in that they will only be called up in specific situations.     
The Science and Technology Directorate   
 The Science and Technology (S&T) directorate combined a number of 
laboratories and programs from the DOE, Department of Defense (DOD), and USDA.  
This directorate is the primary research and development arm of DHS (DHS, Directorate 
for Science and Technology Fact Sheet, 2007).  The main functions transferred into this 
directorate were programs from the DOE.  Absorbed into this directorate of DHS were: 
the chemical and biological national security and supporting programs; various non-
proliferation research and development programs; microbial pathogen programs; and the 
chemical and biological countermeasures program within the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (P.L 107-296, 2002).  Apart from these programs three other 
laboratories were transferred into this directorate: the Environmental Measurements 
Laboratory, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, and the National Bio-Weapons 
Defense Analysis Center.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also created a number of 
new offices within the S&T directorate: Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (HSARPA); the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory 
Committee; and the Homeland Security Institute.  These various programs and 
laboratories focus on three main areas: intramural, industrial, and education (Under 
Secretary McQueary, 2003).  
National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center    
The National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center was transferred to DHS 
from DOD.  In section 1708 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Congress actually 
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created the National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center within the DOD.  “There is 
established in the Department of Defense a National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis 
Center, whose mission is to develop countermeasures to potential attacks by terrorists 
using weapons of mass destruction” (P.L 107-296, 2002).  However, in section 303 of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 Congress transferred the center and its functions to the 
DHS.  The center was renamed to National Bio-Defense Analysis and Countermeasures 
Center (NBACC).  According to Dr. Albright, the Assistant Under Secretary for the S&T 
directorate, the National Bio-Defense Analysis and Countermeasures Center is made up 
of two centers; the Biological Threat Characterization Center and the National 
Bioforensic Analysis Center (2005).   
These two centers carry out the mission of threat awareness and surveillance and 
detection.  Specifically, Dr. Albright highlighted the mission of the National Bio-Defense 
Analysis and Countermeasures Center is to “understand current and future biological 
threats, assess vulnerabilities, and determine potential impacts to guide the research, 
development, and acquisition of biodefense countermeasures such as detectors, drugs, 
vaccines and decontamination technologies; and provide a national capability for 
conducting forensic analysis of evidence from biocrimes and terrorism to attain a 
“biological fingerprint” to identify perpetrators and determine the origin and method of 
attack” (2005).  In FY 2004, the Department completed the planning and conceptual 
design of the National Bio-Defense Analysis and Countermeasures Center facility and 
construction of the facility is planned for completion by the fourth quarter of FY 2008 
(Albright, 2005).  Due to the fact that the National Bio-Defense Analysis and 
Countermeasures Center was created and transferred all within the same law and it was 
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formed within the DHS it most likely did not experience role conflict similar to the other 
agencies transferred into DHS.  However, the employees of this new center may have 
experienced role conflict because it was a new organization.  In an audit by the OIG in 
2004 one senior executive characterized the S&T directorate as a whole as a “startup 
within a merger” (DHS, OIG-04-24, 2004).  As stated previously, role conflict is a 
common problem in mergers. 
 The same law that merged it into DHS created the mission of this agency, 
therefore the mission did not change.  All the roles for this agency would be new due to 
the fact that it was a new agency.  The general turmoil of starting up a new organization 
can cause role ambiguity because employees are not quite sure of what their role is 
specifically in relation to others in the organization.  The expectations for this agency 
were clearly laid out in the law and those expectations appear to be compatible with 
DHS.  However, within new organizations role conflict is often prevalent because there 
can be incompatible expectations from those starting the organization and those at the 
head of the organization.  Role overload may also be present because in many new 
organizations there are so many expectations for employees and the organization itself 
that employees may feel overwhelmed.  Mergers are ripe with role conflict, as are start-
ups within mergers.     
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
The Homeland Security Organization of the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (LLNL) was transferred into DHS as part of the collaboration between the 
DHS and the DOE.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 states “in carrying out the 
missions of the Department, the Secretary may utilize the Department of Energy national 
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laboratories and sites through any one or more of the following methods, as the Secretary 
considers appropriate: (A) A joint sponsorship arrangement referred to in subsection (b).  
(B) A direct contract between the Department and the applicable Department of Energy 
laboratory or site, subject to subsection (c).  (C) Any ‘‘work for others’’ basis made 
available by that laboratory or site.  (D) Any other method provided by law” (P.L 107-
296, 2002).  The Homeland Security Organization is a work for others agreement at the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).  The Homeland Security 
Organization (HSO) is “responsible for those LLNL activities explicitly transferred from 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)” (DOE, Operations Overview, 2004).  
The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory works on a number of homeland security 
programs, but there were two main programs transferred under the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002; the chemical and biological countermeasures program and the nuclear and 
radiological countermeasures program.  Both of these programs were placed into the 
Science and Technology directorate.   
The mission of both of these programs did not change, they both “focus on 
addressing the national need for technologies to quickly detect, identify, and mitigate the 
use of chemical and biological threat agents against the U.S. civilian population, as well 
as counter the threat of terrorist use of nuclear or radiological device in or near a US 
population center” (DOE, Operations Overview, 2004).  DHS became the funding center 
for these programs and set the goals and priorities for what research should be conducted.   
 The mission of this organization did not change and they did not acquire new 
roles or lose any roles.  The expectations for this lab were compatible with DHS, 
however the expectations from DHS were not clear.  The lab had to be responsive to two 
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separate entities and meet the expectations of the DOE and the DHS.  This may cause 
role conflict to occur among those who work at the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory on the Homeland Security Organization.  DOE and DHS were not the only 
ones to set the requirements for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory the 
advisory committee also set requirements for the lab.  Role ambiguity may also occur 
because expectations are coming from so many organizations and the expectations from 
each entity are different and may be incompatible.  The relationship between DHS and 
LLNL were not clear.  These two organizations did share common goals.    
Environmental Measurements Laboratory 
The Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) was also transferred from 
DOE to DHS.  The mission of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory did not 
change when it was transferred into DHS, the focus of the laboratory was and continues 
to be to “measure and evaluate radiation in the environment” (Carafano, 2002).  Dr. 
Mitchell Erickson, Director of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory noted that 
there was a change in mission and administrative relationship with the transition to DHS 
(2006).  According to Dr. Erickson “Environmental Measurements Laboratory rapidly 
and expertly built upon its core competencies to meet the new mission of advancing and 
applying the science and technology required for preventing, protecting against, and 
responding to radiological and nuclear events in the service of Homeland and National 
Security” (2006).  The focus is subtle, but the shift in mission from not just detection, but 
prevention, protection, and response could lead to role conflict because scientists now 
have to focus on more than just detection.  This subtle shift could also lead to role 
overload.   
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 The mission of this agency changed with a subtle shift to include new roles. The 
expectations for this lab are clear and appear to be compatible with the previous 
expectation of just measuring and evaluating radiation in the environment.  Employees 
are trying to maintain a balance between the new roles of prevention, protection, and 
response with their previous role of detection.  It appears that there is balance between 
the roles, however employees may experience role overload from the addition of the new 
priorities.  This role accumulation may have positive as well as negative effects on 
employees. The lab and DHS did not have common goals before the merger, to ensure 
that their goals were more on the same track the mission of the lab was altered.  The 
relationship between the lab and DHS appear to be clear.  Due to the fact that the changes 
were subtle and no employees altered where they worked, their organizational identity 
would surround the lab itself and not the department within which it operated, i.e. DHS.      
Plum Island 
Plum Island Animal Disease Center was transferred from the USDA.  Scientists 
on the island conduct research on foreign animal diseases, which has continued.  
According to the Agricultural Research Service (ARS), which has been responsible for 
the research center since 1954, “in 2003 the DHS joined us on the island, taking 
responsibility for the safety and security of the facility” (USDA, USDA and DHS 
Working Together, 2005).  Due to the fact that DHS only became responsible for the 
safety and security of the center, the goals and the mission of the center did not change 
and role conflict would not occur.  However, adding the responsibility of the security of 
the center could contribute to role overload of the S&T employees. 
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 The mission of the island did not change, however employees did take on new a 
role.  The expectations of what Plum Island does is compatible with DHS, however DHS 
did not take over performing any research on the island or set any of the standards for 
what research should be conducted.  The expectations for DHS in this area are clear in 
that they are maintaining security for the island; however who exactly within DHS is 
performing that role was unclear.  Role overload may result for those employees who 
took over performing security on the island.  Role overload for the employees is not all 
bad, there are positives attached to having increased responsibility, however having too 
many expectations on employees can lead to role conflict.  The research performed on 
Plum Island is extremely sensitive and providing security could be very complicated.   
Security on the island has to be very precise to ensure that no diseases are transferred 
from the island to the U.S.  The relationship between DHS and Plum Island is not clear.  
Due to the fact that no employees from Plum Island transferred to DHS there would not 
be a need to ensure that a new organizational identity was established.   
The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency  
 In the intramural arena, the Science and Technology directorate “works closely 
with scientists and engineers at our national laboratories and other government agencies 
on technological innovations” (Under Secretary McQueary, 2003).  The Homeland 
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency funds research related to homeland 
security through procurement contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements (Homeland 
Security Advanced Research Project Agency Fact Sheet, 2003).  The goal of the 
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency is to get prototypes to public or 
private entities, businesses, development centers, and universities (P.L 107-296, 2002).   
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Congress also required DHS to create University based centers “to establish a 
coordinated, university-based system to enhance the Nation’s homeland security” (P.L 
107-296, 2002).  DHS designated these as centers for excellence and also funded various 
fellow programs and scholarships.  This is a brand new agency created by the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002.  The goals of this agency were compatible with DHS in that they 
gave out funding for homeland security projects.  The expectations of this agency were 
clear and the relationship with DHS was clear.  Since this is a new agency employees 
would not associate with a previous organization.  The problems that this agency might 
encounter revolve around establishing its programs, hiring employees, and other 
administrative tasks, and establishing an organizational identity. 
The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate 
The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate 
“analyzes and integrates terrorist threat information, mapping those threats against both 
physical and cyber vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure and key assets, and 
implementing actions that protect the lives of Americans, ensures the delivery of essential 
government services, and protects infrastructure assets owned by US industry” (DHS, 
OIG-04-13, 2004).  The main objective of this directorate is to consolidate and analyze 
intelligence information from a number of sources and share that information with local 
and state officials.  The agencies transferred into this directorate are: the National 
Infrastructure Protection Center from the FBI, the National Communications System 
from the DOD, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office from the Department of 
Commerce, and the Federal Computer Incident Response Center from the General 
Services Administration. 
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The National Infrastructure Protection Center 
 The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) was transferred to the 
Intelligence Analyze and Infrastructure Protection directorate from the FBI.  The 
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) deals with cyber threats on 
infrastructure within the U.S.  The National Infrastructure Protection Center was 
established in 1999 to “deter, detect, analyze, investigate, and provide warnings of cyber 
threats and attacks on the critical infrastructures of the U.S., including illegal intrusions 
into government and private sector computer networks. The National Infrastructure 
Protection Center will also evaluate, acquire, and deploy computer equipment and cyber 
tools to support investigations and infrastructure protection efforts” (Reno, 1999).  This 
center is a collaboration between many government agencies, the intelligence 
community, and the private sector.  When transferred into the DHS the National 
Infrastructure Protection Center was separated into two different divisions.  The 
responsibilities were separated between those that dealt with the physical infrastructure 
assessment and protection and those that dealt with the cyber infrastructure (Department 
of Homeland Security Contact Information).   
 The mission of the center was not changed when it was merged into DHS and 
they did not acquire new roles or lose any roles.  The expectations for this center were 
clear and with the separation into two divisions that could clarify the expectations of each 
areas role further.  However, that could also contribute to role conflict as well.  The 
expectations of this center were compatible with the IAIP.  The relationship between this 
center and DHS appear to be clear before the merger as well.   
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 However, a bigger problem that the National Infrastructure Protection Center had 
to deal with is the personnel shortage.  According to IG Ervin (2004) “when the National 
Infrastructure Protection Center transferred into IAIP, personnel who actually left the FBI 
and remained with the National Infrastructure Protection Center filled only 18 of the 307 
full time employee positions targeted for transfer. The other 289 were vacant.”  Due to 
the fact that only 18 employees made the transfer role overload would be the biggest 
concern and also creating the new organizational identity to ensure that those employees 
do not leave the center. 
National Communications System  
 The National Communications System (NCS) was transferred from the DOD into 
the Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate.  This system was 
created shortly after the Cuban Missile crisis to form a single unified communications 
system to serve the President, the DOD, the intelligence community, the diplomatic 
community, and civilian leaders (NCS, Background and History, 2007).  The system was 
established by President Kennedy and included linking the assets of six Departments, 
improving, and extending the communications facilities and components of various 
Federal agencies, focusing on interconnectivity, and survivability (NCS, Background and 
History, 2007).  President Regan broadened the National Communications System’s 
capabilities in 1983 and expanded the membership of Federal agencies from six to 
twenty-three (NCS, Background and History, 2007).  President Bush expanded it again in 
2007 by adding the Director of National Intelligence to the membership.   
 The mission of the National Communications System is “to assist the President, 
the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Director of the Office 
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of Science and Technology Policy and the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget in the exercise of the telecommunications functions and responsibilities set forth 
in Section 2 of this Order” which includes wartime functions, emergency communication 
functions, policy guidance for Federal telecommunication assets, and more (E.O. 12472, 
2003).  The mission of the National Communications System also includes, “the 
coordination of the planning for and provision of national security and emergency 
preparedness communications for the Federal government under all circumstances, 
including crisis or emergency, attack, recovery, and reconstitution” (E.O 12472, 2003).  
Each Department that is a member agency has specific responsibilities under the 
Executive Order.   
 DHS is designated as the Executive Agent of the National Communications 
System.  As such they designate the manager of the National Communications System, 
ensure that it is operating properly and is prepared to meet the needs of the Federal 
government in case of an emergency.  They also advise and assist state and local 
governments to ensure that they have plans and procedures in place for identifying their 
telecommunications needs in case of an emergency or national security situation, and 
ensure to the maximum extent practicable that state and local government planning is 
mutually supportive and consistent with the Federal government (E.O. 12472, 2003).  
 The mission of this system did not change and the center did not take on any new 
roles.  The expectations for this system were compatible with DHS before the merger and 
are clear.  The agency and DHS have common goals as well.  This is another interagency 
system where each department has a specific role to fulfill.  The role of DHS is to ensure 
that the system continues to run smoothly as well as assist state and local governments 
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have plans in place for identifying their telecommunications needs should an emergency 
arise.  Due to the fact that the goals and responsibilities of each department are clearly 
laid out in the Executive Order this would relieve role conflict that the employees may 
experience within the merger.  Employees in this organization would identify with the 
NCS.     
Federal Computer Incident Response Center 
 The Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FedCIRC) was transferred from 
the GSA, manages computer security throughout the government.  According to the 
Acting Administrator in 2001 the Federal Computer Incident Response Center “is a 
collaborative partnership drawing on the skills and resources within Government, 
academia, and the private sector to address computer security related incidents” (Davis, 
2001).  The main mission of the Federal Computer Incident Response Center while in the 
GSA was “to be the Federal civilian government's trusted focal point for computer 
security incident reporting, sharing information on common vulnerabilities, and to 
provide assistance with incident prevention and response” (Acting Commissioner 
McDonald, 2002).  Acting Commissioner McDonald (2002) noted that the Federal 
Computer Incident Response Center performs four major activities for the federal 
government.  The first being it provides timely technical assistance to operators of agency 
information systems regarding security incidents, including guidance on detecting and 
handling information security incidents.  The second major activity is compiling and 
analyzing information about incidents that threaten information security.  The third major 
activity of the Federal Computer Incident Response Center is to inform operators of 
agency information systems about current and potential information security threats and 
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vulnerabilities and the last major activity of the Federal Computer Incident Response 
Center is to consult with agencies or offices operating or exercising control of national 
security systems.  When transferred to DHS the major activities and mission of the 
Federal Computer Incident Response Center didn’t change, however the Federal 
Computer Incident Response Center itself changed. 
DHS created the U.S Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) in 2003 
with the Federal Computer Incident Response Center as the initial nucleus (DHS, Privacy 
Impact Assessment, 2007).  The fact that the mission and activities of the Federal 
Computer Incident Response Center did not change would help alleviate some role 
conflict.  However, role conflict may still occur because of the change of culture and the 
addition of tools to improve cyber-security and a new 24x7 Incident Handling Response 
Center.  Role conflict can also result from maintaining the partnerships with other federal 
agencies, the private sector, and public institutions “that have homeland security 
responsibilities for infrastructure sectors not covered by DHS” (DHS, OIG-04-13, 2004). 
 The mission of the FedCIRC did not change when it was transferred into DHS 
however it did acquire the new role of being the nucleus for the U.S Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team.  The expectations of this agency were clear within DHS and 
appear to be clear within this directorate, as this agency’s main focus was on mapping 
cyber vulnerabilities and protecting that infrastructure.  Employees in this directorate may 
still identify with their previous organization.  This agency also had to respond to a 
number of audiences in that it is a collaborative partnership with academia and the private 
sector.  That could lead to role conflict among employees of this agency. 
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Energy Security and Assurance Program 
 The Energy Security and Assurance Program (ESA) was transferred from the 
DOE into the DHS.  This program was designed to protect the Nation from severe energy 
disruptions (H.R. Rep. No. 107-681, 2002).  The Energy Security and Assurance program 
is a single program with six main activities: energy disruptions and preparedness, 
coordination with the private sector, state, and local government support, policy and 
analysis support, criticality of energy assets, technology development and application, 
and program direction (DOE, CFO, Budget Analysis, 2004).  The program works with 
the private sector, state and local governments, and the National Infrastructure Simulation 
and Analysis Center (NISAC) to provide technical support during an emergency (S. Rep 
No. 107-220, 2002).  Due to the fact that this program works so closely with the National 
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, Congress also transferred that center to 
DHS in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.   
 The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center “conducts advanced 
modeling and simulation activities that examine the potential consequences from terrorist 
attacks and natural disasters that impact critical infrastructure and key resources” (DHS, 
Office of Infrastructure Protection Goals, 2007).  When transferred into the DHS the 
Energy Security and Assurance program’s mission did not change.  Since both programs 
were moved to the new department together Congress hoped that would ensure a 
smoother transfer.  “Keeping the Energy Security and Assurance program and National 
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center programs together will maintain program 
coherence, since the Energy Security and Assurance program provides analysis and 
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support for National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center” (House Committee 
on Science and Technology, Republican Caucus, 2008).   
 The mission of these two agencies did not change when they were merged into 
DHS.  They also did not acquire new roles or lose any roles.  The expectations for the 
ESA program were compatible with DHS before being merged into it.  The expectations 
for the program did not change when it was merged within DHS.  The relationship is 
clear as well and due to the fact that the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis 
Center was merged into DHS as well, that will help employees identify with the new 
organization quicker.    
 The Coast Guard 
 The Coast Guard experienced the most conflict of the agencies transferred into 
DHS.  The Coast Guard’s mission was greatly expanded under the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002.  The Coast Guard is a military organization, but was a part of the 
Department of Treasury before being transferred into DHS.  When merged with DHS the 
Coast Guard was transferred in such a way that it reported directly to the Secretary.  The 
Coast Guard originally had six missions; marine safety, search and rescue, aids to 
navigation, living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement), marine environmental 
protection, and ice operations.  Congress in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 has 
deemed these as the Coast Guard’s ‘non-homeland security missions’.  Congress added 
five additional missions within the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  These are deemed 
the homeland security missions and consist of; ports, waterways and coastal security, 
drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, defense readiness, and other law enforcement.  
Both sets of missions were a part of the Coast Guard’s overall mission before the transfer 
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into DHS; however Congress delineated them within the creation of DHS.  Due to the 
variety of missions and the amount of roles, both role overload and role conflict is a 
concern.  Congress has been extremely concerned about mission performance and has 
addressed this question to the Commandant of the Coast Guard in a number of hearings.  
Some in Congress have even attempted to pass legislation to ensure that the non-
homeland security missions do not take a back seat to the homeland security missions. 
 Senator Daniel Akaka (D-HI) introduced legislation on April 11, 2003 “to 
guarantee the fulfillment of non-homeland security functions of the Coast Guard that 
Americans rely on daily.”  The legislation was titled the Non-Homeland Security Mission 
Performance Act of 2003.  The legislation did not focus solely on the Coast Guard, 
however when introducing the legislation, Senator Akaka (D-HI) focused his attention on 
the Coast Guard and the importance of the non-homeland security missions to Hawaii.  
Senator Akaka stated that  
“the establishment of the DHS created additional management challenges 
and has fueled growing concerns that the performance of core, non-
homeland security functions will slip through the cracks. Just last week, 
the Government Accounting Office (GAO) testified before the House 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure that the Coast Guard has 
experienced a substantial decline in the amount of time spent on core 
missions. Moreover, the GAO found that the Coast Guard lacks the 
resources to reverse this trend. Coast Guard Commandant Thomas H. 
Collins is quoted as saying that his agency has more business than it has 
resources and is challenged like never before to do all that America wants 
it to do” (2003).    
 The legislation would require that each agency that performs non-homeland 
security missions submit a report on the agency with particular emphasis on the non-
homeland security missions (S.910, 2003).  The reports should “provide an inventory of 
the non-homeland security functions and identify the capabilities with respect to those 
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functions; contain information relating to the roles, responsibilities, organizational 
structure, capabilities, personnel assets, and annual budgets, specifically with respect to 
the capabilities to accomplish non-homeland security functions without any 
diminishment; contain information relating to whether any changes are required to the 
roles, responsibilities, functions, organizational structure, projects, activities, and annual 
fiscal resources to accomplish non-homeland security functions without diminishment; 
and contain the strategy the Department will use for the performance of non -homeland 
security functions and homeland security functions” (S.910, 2003).  The legislation did 
not make it out of committee; however the concern for the balance of missions within the 
Coast Guard did not die. 
 In a 2004 report on the major management challenges within the DHS the OIG 
found three major barriers to performing its non-homeland security missions.  The first 
barrier was the lack of a comprehensive and fully defined performance management 
system (DHS, OIG-05-06, 2004).  Without a proper performance management system the 
Coast Guard is not able to adequately gauge the balance of its missions and how it is 
performing the various missions.  The second barrier facing the Coast Guard is the 
continuing increase of workload demands as the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 
2002 (MTSA) is implemented (DHS, OIG-05-06, 2004).  The Maritime Transportation 
Security Act of 2002 added another duty to the Coast Guard of conducting vulnerability 
assessments of fifty identified seaports (Senate Report 107-64, 2001).  This added 
responsibility will continue to stretch the personnel of the Coast Guard, which is the third 
barrier identified by the IG.  The Coast Guard’s staff has declined in recent years, and its 
infrastructure has been taxed to the point where there are questions about the aging fleet 
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being able to meet all the new challenges of its mission.  In 2005 Commandant Admiral 
Thomas Collins testified before the House Subcommittee on Economic Security, 
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity regarding these barriers and other questions 
about the Homeland Security missions of the post-9/11 Coast Guard. 
This subcommittee wanted to ensure that the Coast Guard had the resources 
needed to balance the missions of homeland security and all the other missions that they 
were responsible for before joining DHS.  During the hearing Admiral Collins (2005) 
noted that 45 to 46 percent of the total Coast Guard budget base is going towards 
homeland security missions as described within the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  
However, he did not believe that the other missions were being neglected.  In fact he 
highlighted throughout the hearing that the Coast Guard is a military, multi-mission, 
maritime service.  That is not to say that Admiral Collins believed that the additional 
missions had not added strain to the Coast Guard.  “These and other critical roles have 
imparted a tremendous challenge on Coast Guard men and women” (The Homeland 
Security Missions of Post 9/11 Coast Guard, 2005).  Examining the statement it appears 
that Admiral Collins does not believe that the additional missions have lead to role 
conflict among the employees of the Coast Guard because even prior to the addition of 
the homeland security missions the Coast Guard was a multi-mission service.  “The 
competencies necessary to do a variety of missions are built into that platform in the 
amount of people --.  Not everyone knows every mission.  We have multi-mission ships 
and multi-mission planes.  A ship could be doing a search and rescue mission in the 
morning and could be interdicting drugs in the afternoon, which is frequently the case, by 
the way.  And I would submit if you look at mission area by mission area by mission 
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area, our mission performance has been extraordinary and it hasn’t taken a back seat 
anywhere” (The Homeland Security Missions of Post 9/11 Coast Guard, 2005).  
However, the question of resources and balance of missions still lingers. 
In 2006 while preparing the FY 2007 budget the Congressional Research Service, 
which provides policy and legal analysis to committees and members of both the House 
and Senate, submitted an analysis of the budget request for the Coast Guard which 
highlighted that 54 percent of the requested budget was for homeland security missions 
(O’Rourke, 2006).  The Coast Guard will always have many missions and it appears they  
 The mission of the Coast Guard changed dramatically with the merger into DHS 
and they acquired a number of new roles.  The biggest concern within Congress for the 
Coast Guard is how they will be able to balance all the missions that they have.  Role 
overload could be present amongst employees.  Due to the fact that they are a multi-
mission organization and every employee does not have knowledge of every mission 
could help to alleviate some of the negative consequences of role overload.  The Coast 
Guard has worked to ensure that employees do not experience too much role overload by 
making units mission specific.  Expectations are clearly laid out for the Coast Guard and 
appear to be compatible with the DHS before they were merged.  The relationship with 
the DHS before the merger is not clear until Congress identified the new roles for the 
Coast Guard.  The organizational identity of being a member of the Coast Guard would 
overrule the identity of being a member of DHS.        
The Secret Service 
   The Secret Service began in the late 1860’s to investigate the counterfeiting of 
U.S. currency.  Over the years their mission was expanded to include protection of the 
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President, Vice-President, and other important political figures, cyber and 
telecommunications fraud, and other crimes that involve fraud and financial institutions 
(Secret Service, 2008).  The Secret Service handles security at events that are deemed as 
National Special Security Events by the President or the Secretary of DHS.  They also 
have a threat assessment center, which provides Federal, State, and local law enforcement 
agencies with training, research, and consultation on complex threat assessment (P.L. 
106-544, 2000).  When the Secret Service was transferred into DHS it was transferred as 
a distinct entity that reports directly to the Secretary of DHS (P.L. 107-296, 2002).   
 Due to the fact that the Secret Service was transferred as a whole and reports 
directly to the Secretary and the mission of the organization did not change, therefore role 
conflict is lessened.  The Secret Service did acquire new roles in that it was now 
designated to assist at National Special Security Events.  Before merging into DHS it is 
not clear how the Secret Service is compatible with DHS.  The expectations for the 
service are clear in that they did not change.  Due to the fact that the service was 
transferred as a whole, most employees would identify with the service and not with the 
Treasury Department.  However, role conflict may result from the many varied priorities 
within the Secret Service.  However, since they have managed these various missions for 
a number of years, it seems that is not having a negative effect on the organization. 
Conflict within the Directorates  
 The agencies are not the only organizations within the DHS that experienced 
conflict from the merger.  The directorates also had a number of conflicts.  Many of the 
sources of conflicts within the directorates are similar to the conflicts within the agencies.  
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In some cases, the conflicts within the directorates had a direct effect on the conflict 
within the agencies.      
 The agencies transferred into the Border and Transportation Security directorate 
were placed there because management believed there was mission overlap between 
protecting the U.S by enforcing immigration and customs laws, as well as overseeing the 
border.  “The men and women of these various agencies carry out their responsibilities 
diligently, but they operate under a fragmented system.  For example, both INS and 
Customs Service conduct criminal investigations.  The result is that too frequently, 
investigators from both agencies are pursuing similar cases or even the exact same ones” 
(DHS, Border Reorganization Speech, 2003).  To enhance efficiency and create a more 
seamless unit at the border, DHS created two bureaus that would focus on the border in 
different ways.   
The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection would focus on border protection 
and inspections.  The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement would focus on 
investigation and law enforcement.  According to DHS, “these two new bureaus will 
break down barriers to communication and provide a direct line of authority to the 
Department's headquarters and give homeland security employees a clear mission.  It will 
join the investigators with the investigators and the inspectors with the inspectors to 
capitalize on expertise and resources” (DHS Press Release, 2003).  However, this change 
ended up splitting many of the agencies that were merged into this directorate thus, role 
conflict may have actually been created by altering the respective missions of the 
agencies involved.  Congressman Rogers (R-AL) chaired a Congressional hearing 
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concerning these bureaus in 2005 and questioned whether the means of reorganization 
accomplished its stated goal.   
The reorganization charged Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents with 
carrying out the duties and functions formerly carried out by three separate agencies and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents with the enforcement of both the 
laws of immigration and customs.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was 
rearranged to contain the Office of Detention and Removal, the Office of Intelligence, the 
Federal Protection Service, and the Federal Air Marshals (CBP and ICE Hearing, 2005).  
Congressman Rogers (2005) noted during the hearing concerning Customs and Border 
Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, that “we have heard of concerns that 
inspectors are not receiving investigative support as readily as before the reorganization 
and that reorganization may have created bureaucratic walls that impede effective and 
efficient communication and information sharing” (CBP and ICE Hearing, 2005).   
 This directorate has to respond to many different audiences with different needs 
and expectations for how to accomplish their jobs, which is the largest contributor to role 
conflict.  This directorate also must rely on other agencies to fulfill a number of 
expectations and this can also contribute to role conflict because each agency has an 
opinion on how the job should be accomplished.  However, because the goals of the 
directorate did not change, but were clarified this could help alleviate role conflict. 
 During Secretary Ridge’s swearing in before Congress he stated “under the 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate in the new Department, we will 
strengthen our relationship with first responders and partner with the states, cities, and 
counties that manage and fund them.  We will work with Congress to provide them with 
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the resources they need, beginning with the President's First Responder Initiative, which 
offered a thousand-percent increase in funding to equip, train, and drill first responders to 
meet a conventional attack or one involving a weapon of mass destruction” (Ridge, 
2003).  However, the Office of Domestic Preparedness, which is the main office for 
many grant programs, was placed within the Border and Transportation Security 
directorate.  The Emergency Preparedness Response directorate modified the focus of the 
various agencies and programs that were transferred into it from a singular focus to an 
all-hazards focus.  These changes led to conflict within the directorate as well as between 
the programs, which had to rely on their old agencies for assistance and direction. 
 The biggest source of conflict within this directorate is the reliance on other 
Departments.  This directorate contains two interagency teams in which DHS only 
manages the teams when there is an emergency.  When the teams are not needed they 
work within their home departments.  A separate source of conflict within this directorate 
is the fact that FEMA is the backbone, however grants for preparedness and response 
were placed into the Border and Transportation directorate.  This conflict was rectified 
after a few years, but this separation of roles into two directorates would affect how 
employees perform their duties.   
The main focus of this directorate is collaborating with other government 
agencies to ensure that research and development pertinent to homeland security occurs 
at a rapid pace.  In 2005 management of this directorate reported to the Homeland 
Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) that “S&T continues 
to emphasize the Directorate’s role in interacting with other federal departments and 
agencies. Over the last year, S&T has worked with the Office of Science and Technology 
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Policy, the Homeland Security Council, the National Security Council, the Office of 
Management and Budget, and the Office of the Vice President to begin a government-
wide effort to coordinate homeland security R&D efforts, as Congress directed in the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002” (HSSTAC Minutes, 2005).  The Homeland Security 
Science and Technology Advisory Committee was created as an advisory committee to 
the S&T directorate through the Homeland Security Act of 2002.   
The committee was made up of twenty members with differing backgrounds from 
emergency responders to representatives of citizen groups (P.L 107-296, 2002).  The 
group was created with the mission to serve as a source of independent, scientific, and 
technical planning advice for the Under Secretary for Science and Technology (DHS, 
Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee, 2004).  The group 
was also given a time limit for its mission, three years.  The committee took time to get 
set-up and didn’t have their first meeting until February 2004.  Their termination date 
was January 2005; however they did continue to meet until the end of 2005.  The 
committee has not met since that time, during the meetings the S&T directorate continued 
to emphasize their work collaborating with other government agencies.   
The biggest contributors to conflict within the S&T directorate are the 
administrative and logistical issues of managing the goals and priorities of the multiple 
audiences that they have to interact with; internal, external, and educational.  In 2004 the 
OIG highlighted that many of the administrative and logistical issues are the result of the 
dependence of the S&T directorate on other federal agencies for services (DHS, OIG-04-
24, 2004).  In 2006 Jay Cohen, Under Secretary of the S&T directorate realigned the 
directorate.  The directorate was separated into six divisions that are focused on specific 
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areas of research (DHS, Science and Technology Organization, 2007, with each division 
serving a number of customers within the Department.   
The borders and maritime security division develops and transitions tools and 
technologies that improve the security of our Nation's borders and waterways, without 
impeding the flow of commerce and travelers.  The chemical and biological division 
works to increase the Nation's preparedness against chemical and biological threats 
through improved threat awareness, advanced surveillance and detection, and protective 
countermeasures.  The command, control, and interoperability division develops 
interoperable communication standards and protocols for emergency responders, cyber 
security tools for protecting the integrity of the Internet, and automated capabilities to 
recognize and analyze potential threats.  The explosives division develops the technical 
capabilities to detect, interdict, and lessen the impacts of non-nuclear explosives used in 
terrorist attacks against mass transit, civil aviation, and critical infrastructure.  The human 
factors division applies the social and behavioral sciences to improve detection, analysis, 
and understanding and response to homeland security threats.  The infrastructure and 
geophysical division focuses on identifying and mitigating the vulnerabilities of the 
seventeen critical infrastructure and key assets that keep our society and economy 
functioning.  This is the second realignment in four years.   According to testimony from 
Under Secretary Cohen (2006) the goals of the directorate did not change, but were 
clarified.  
 The mission of the directorate did not change, however the amount of change in 
such a short period of time can contribute to role ambiguity.  Also, this directorate has to 
respond to many different audiences with different needs and expectations for how to 
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accomplish their jobs, which is the largest contributor to role conflict.  Many of the 
agencies within this directorate did not take on new roles; however with the change to 
being responsive to so many varied audiences they may have too many projects to 
manage.  This directorate also must rely on other agencies to fulfill a number of 
expectations this can also contribute to role conflict because each agency has an opinion 
on how the job should be accomplished.  However, because the goals of the directorate 
did not change, but were clarified this could help alleviate role conflict.  Also, the 
realignment could help the agencies balance the various roles that they are filling because 
now they understand who they can ask for role clarity if need be.      
 The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate does 
not collect any intelligence it only analyzes what information it is given.  The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security that was published in July 2002 stated that, “the CIA is 
specifically responsible for gathering and analyzing all information regarding potential 
terrorist threats abroad. The proposed IAIP Division within the DHS would be able not 
only to access and analyze homeland security information, but also to translate it into 
warning and protective action.”   
 Due to the fact that the IAIP was not collecting any intelligence just analyzing it, 
role conflict can result from the dependence on other agencies and centers, programs that 
overlap the role of the IAIP.  Early in 2003 President Bush directed the Director of 
Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, and the Secretaries of DHS and the DOD to 
create a Terrorist Threat Integration Center (White House, 2003).  The head of this new 
center would report to the Director of Central Intelligence.  According to Inspector 
General Skinner (2005), “with the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center 
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under the Director of Central Intelligence and the Terrorist Screening Center under the 
Director of the FBI, the role and responsibilities of IAIP for intelligence collection, 
analysis, and dissemination has been abated. Creation of the new Director of National 
Intelligence position makes the DHS intelligence coordination role even more uncertain, 
calling for prompt clarification of federal lines of authority in this area.”  While the role 
conflict may not affect each individual agency that was transferred into this directorate, 
the lack of a clear role for the directorate would filter down to the individual agencies.   
The IAIP also had a lot of turnover of key management positions and also had to deal 
with space problems along with the rest of DHS (DHS, OIG-04-13, 2004).  Both of these 
problems can lead to role conflict among the agencies that were transferred into the IAIP.   
 Similar to the other directorates, the agencies that were transferred into the 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate had to collaborate with all 
the other agencies that were collecting the intelligence as well as the public.  Role 
conflict can result from this collaboration because the expectations between the agencies 
that collect the intelligence and the public’s thirst for information may be incompatible.  
This directorate had some new programs created within it, which could contribute to role 
conflict because employees must learn the new program and manage the expectations of 
all those utilizing the program.  Agencies within this directorate also had to deal with a 
personnel shortage.  This would contribute to the role overload of the employees who 
work within these agencies.  Role overload is the biggest problem within this directorate.  
Without the responsibility of collection, people may experience the positive 
  
 
effects of role overload as well as the negative, but this can be bad for the overall organization as people may leave because 
they feel overburdened and now they have even more skills to market themselves with.  
Table 1: Sources of Role Conflict within the Agencies 
Agency Sources of Conflict Previous 
Dept. 
Reporting Line 
 Stated 
Mission 
Change 
Reliance 
on other 
agencies 
for 
Admin 
Identify 
with 
Number of 
Audiences 
Role 
Ambiguity 
Role 
Conflict 
Role 
Overload 
  
Federal 
Protective 
Service 
Yes Yes FPS 4 No Yes No Government 
Service 
Agency 
Under 
Secretary for 
Border and 
Transportation 
Directorate 
Coast Guard Yes No Coast 
Guard 
5 No No  Yes DOT Secretary of 
DHS 
Immigration 
and 
Naturalization 
Services 
Yes No INS 4 Possibly No No Justice Under 
Secretary for 
Border and 
Transportation 
Directorate 
U.S. Customs 
Service 
Yes  No Customs 4 No Yes No Treasury Under 
Secretary for 
Border and 
Transportation 
Directorate 
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FEMA Yes No FEMA 4 Yes No No Independent 
Agency 
Under 
Secretary for 
Emergency 
Preparedness 
and Response 
Directorate 
Environmental 
Measures 
Laboratory 
Yes No EML 4 No Yes Yes Department 
of Energy 
Under 
Secretary for 
Science and 
Technology 
Directorate 
Agricultural 
Quarantine 
Inspection 
No Yes AQI 5 Yes Yes No USDA Under 
Secretary for 
Border and 
Transportation 
Directorate 
Office of 
Domestic 
Preparedness 
No Yes ODP 6 No Yes No Justice Under 
Secretary for 
Border and 
Transportation 
Directorate 
Strategic 
National 
Stockpile 
No Yes HHS 5 No No No Health and 
Human 
Services 
Under 
Secretary for 
Emergency 
Preparedness 
and Response 
Directorate 
Interagency 
Teams 
No Yes Organizat-
ions in 
which they 
work 
Varied - 
dependent 
on the type 
of 
emergency 
No Yes No Department 
of Energy 
and Justice 
Under 
Secretary for 
Emergency 
Preparedness 
and Response 
Directorate 
Lawrence 
Livermore 
National 
Laboratory 
No Yes LLNL 5 Yes No No Department 
of Energy 
Under 
Secretary for 
Science and 
Technology 
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Directorate 
Plum Island No Yes Plum 
Island 
5 No No Yes USDA Under 
Secretary for 
Science and 
Technology 
Directorate 
National 
Domestic 
Preparedness 
Office 
No No Organizat-
ions in 
which they 
work 
11 Yes No No FBI (Justice) Under 
Secretary for 
Emergency 
Preparedness 
and Response 
Directorate 
TSA No No DHS 4 Yes No No DOT Under 
Secretary for 
Border and 
Transportation 
Directorate 
National 
Disaster Medical 
System 
No No Organizat-
ions in 
which they 
work 
Varied - 
dependent 
on the type 
of 
emergency 
No No No Health and 
Human 
Services 
Under 
Secretary for 
Emergency 
Preparedness 
and Response 
Directorate 
National Bio-
Weapons 
Defense 
Analysis Center 
No No DHS 4 No No No DOD Under 
Secretary for 
Science and 
Technology 
Directorate 
National 
Infrastructure 
Protection 
Center 
No No NIPC 4 No Yes No FBI (Justice) Under 
Secretary for 
Science and 
Technology 
Directorate 
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National 
Communication 
Systems 
No No Organizat-
ions in 
which they 
work 
Many No No No DOD Under 
Secretary for 
Intelligence 
Analysis and 
Infrastructure 
Protection 
Federal 
Computer 
Incident 
Response Center 
No No FedCIRC 7 No Yes No Government 
Service 
Agency 
Under 
Secretary for 
Intelligence 
Analysis and 
Infrastructure 
Protection 
Energy Security 
Assurance 
Program 
No No DOE 6 No No No Department 
of Energy 
Under 
Secretary for 
Intelligence 
Analysis and 
Infrastructure 
Protection 
Federal Law 
Enforcement 
Training Center 
No No FLETC 4 No No No Treasury Under 
Secretary for 
Border and 
Transportation 
Directorate 
Secret Service No No Secret 
Service 
4 No No No Treasury Secretary of 
DHS 
 
*Reliance on other agencies for admin, denotes that these agencies rely on their previous department for administrative 
support. 
*The identify with column denotes which agency or department the employees of the agency that merged into DHS would 
identify with.     
*Audiences for all agencies are Congress, the President, the American public, and the DHS administration; therefore each 
agency began with four audiences.   
* Reporting line denotes who within DHS the head of an agency reports to.   
  
 
In Table 1, I have collapsed information about the conflict within the DHS 
agencies to indicate how role ambiguity, conflict, and overload are related to mission 
change and reporting lines.  Examining the data only the border agencies, the Office of 
Domestic Preparedness, the Coast Guard, Environmental Measures Laboratory, and 
FEMA had their missions changed.  Most of these agencies only had a slight change in 
their mission with terrorism added as another area of focus.  Therefore, if the mission of 
the organization outlines its purpose and goals it is safe to say that the majority of the 
agencies merged into DHS did not experience role conflict because the expectation of 
their agency did not change.  If it had changed the mission would have been altered.   
 Having a mission altered is not the only reason that agencies may have 
experienced role conflict.  Seven agencies appear to be at risk or are at risk to experience 
role conflict.  The main reason that these agencies are more vulnerable to role conflict is 
due to the fact that their organizational culture and identity remain with their old 
organization or the organizations in which the employees work.  This is especially 
evident in the interagency teams, which are only managed by DHS in specific emergency 
situations.  In these situations specifically however the teams are used to working with a 
variety of agencies, as that is the nature of these teams.  Another contributing factor in 
role conflict is whether or not the agencies were compatible with DHS before merging.  
This is the case with the Federal Protective Services, the compatibility between these 
agencies were not obvious because of the job that FPS was performing before merging 
into DHS.  Its mission was altered when it was added into DHS and this made it more 
compatible, however it also leads to over conflict.   
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 Only three agencies had roles added to their current roles.  The Coast Guard had 
the most roles added to its already full mission.  This resulted in them having eleven roles 
total.  The Environmental Measures laboratory added three new roles to their mission to 
total five roles for the employees of the lab.  Both of these agencies added 
complementary roles.  However, even complementary roles can result in role overload.  
Employees in these two agencies may have experienced some of the benefits of role 
overload such as privileges, status enhancement, and personal enhancement.  Plum Island 
also added another role; however not knowing who exactly within DHS is performing the 
security at Plum Island it is difficult to determine who exactly may experience role 
overload.  However, role overload may result from more than just an addition of a role 
for the organization.  Employees may have taken on new roles even though the mission 
of the organization did not change because it was needed to help fulfill their original 
mission.  In these situations it is more likely that the roles would be compatible and 
employees would experience the positive effects of role overload.   
According to the data, seven agencies are susceptible to experience role 
ambiguity.  This is the case for many of the directorates as well.  Some of the causes of 
role ambiguity are rapid organizational change and organizational complexity.  All of the 
agencies within DHS experienced these two factors.  In particular the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service that was separated into two different agencies within DHS, but not 
all of the pieces of INS made the merger into DHS and other pieces went to other 
Departments.  FEMA was in a similar situation as INS in that the agency was separated 
into a number of pieces.  The Agricultural Inspection Service had to rely on USDA to set 
some of the expectations for their job performance, while DHS was actually managing 
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their performance.  The Lawrence Livermore laboratory was in a similar situation as AQI 
in that DHS only had oversight of the Homeland Security Organization, but the 
Department of Energy also set expectations for the lab overall which would affect those 
employees who work within the Homeland Security Organization.  The National 
Domestic Preparedness Office had to respond to the most audiences, the reason being that 
eleven offices were members of this office.  This office did not have any dedicated staff 
when it was merged into DHS, however it was placed within the Office of Domestic 
Preparedness, which experienced a lot of organizational change over the last five years.  
The Transportation Security Agency was set up quickly after September 11th and this 
rapid organizational change combined with having to hire so many employees so quickly 
would lead to role ambiguity within this agency.   
Looking at the agencies that experienced role ambiguity a number of them still 
identified with their old organization.  The INS most likely identified with their previous 
organization, as did many of the border agencies because agencies in uniform tend to 
have a stronger identification within that unit.  One could believe that it is because they 
have to protect each other while on duty and not just perform their jobs.  This is one 
reason that the Coast Guard and the Secret Service would most likely identify more with 
the agency as a whole and not DHS.  Establishing that new organizational identity in 
which employees see themselves as employees of DHS is a big feat for DHS due to the 
fact that they are not all in the same building and creating that organizational culture 
takes time without a shared space.       
 Some of the smaller agencies within DHS may have benefited from their size.  
This is due to the fact that consensus among audiences is more likely within smaller 
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agencies.  However, one of the largest agencies, the Secret Service, may not have 
experienced role conflict, but that was most likely because their role was not altered 
when they were merged within DHS.  The Federal Law Enforcement Center is another 
agency that appears to not have experienced any conflict related to its role and that is 
most likely because their role did not change and was not altered.  
Most of the agencies within DHS did not experience conflict related to their roles 
or have roles added to their mission.  However, the conflict that they were experiencing 
related to the merger in general would have put a strain on fulfilling their roles.  Mergers 
are stressful to go through and employees had to learn how to operate in a new 
environment resulting from the merger even though their workspace did not change.  
Undergoing so much change in such a short period of time with such high expectations 
placed upon an organization, there is no wonder why so many of the agencies merged 
into DHS experienced conflict and did not perform their jobs one hundred percent out of 
the gate.   
 There is no easy way to resolve role conflict, however there are some ways in 
which employees can try to lessen the affects of it.  One of the first ways to resolve role 
conflict is to interpenetrate the new role throughout the other roles that the agency is 
currently occupying.  This would be easier for agencies like the Environmental 
Measurements Lab in which their new role only altered their current role slightly.  The 
Coast Guard appears to utilize compartmentalization to resolve their role conflict.  There 
are multi-mission ships that fill particular roles.  When an employee is on that ship, the 
mission is clear and the employee can fulfill a given role to help the mission succeed.  
Congress with the passage of the Hurricane Katrina Relief Act helped FEMA merge 
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missions together, so that they would in turn focus again on all hazards and not just one 
area.  This act also put all of the roles back within FEMA when originally they were 
separated out.  This would also help to alleviate the role conflict within the Office of 
Domestic Preparedness, because it was placed within FEMA after becoming the Office of 
Grants and Training in 2005.  Within the Border agencies the easiest way for them to 
relieve their role conflict would be to alternate between the given roles.  Focus on the one 
area in which they have been placed and try to forget the other roles that they were 
fulfilling before the merger.  The only other option for the agencies within DHS to 
resolve their role conflict is to altercast the roles, and try to reorient the audiences role 
expectations.  This seems to be difficult with the number of audiences that some agencies 
within DHS had to deal with, however it is not impossible.        
In Sum 
 Agencies merged into DHS had a heavy mission to fulfill.  They had to work to 
prevent another terrorist attack.  Reduce America’s vulnerability to another terrorist 
attack and deter another terrorist attack.  Protect the American public against another 
terrorist attack and respond to threats and all hazards, be they man-made or natural.  
Ensure that the borders are safe, welcoming lawful immigrants and visitors, while 
promoting the free flow of commerce.  All the while carrying out their previous mission, 
without diminishment.  The majority of agencies merged into DHS did not have their 
stated mission altered.  However, many agencies experienced conflict over the 
expectations that they had been given before becoming a part of DHS and the 
expectations that they were given after.  Agencies also needed the expectations to be 
compatible with DHS and for it to make sense of where they were placed within the new 
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department.  The agencies combined together to form DHS had to work quickly to create 
new organizational identities and ensure that employees identified with the particular 
agency and not the old department that they were a part of.    
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Chapter 4  Conclusion 
 Since its inception the DHS has continually changed.  Due to all those changes, 
employees may not understand their role in the larger organization.  This chapter recaps 
the problems that DHS has encountered since it was formed, how role theory explains 
some of the problems that it has encountered, limitations of this study, and areas for 
further study.  To begin, this chapter will examine more changes that the DHS 
experienced with a change in upper management.   
In 2005 DHS underwent another significant change; Secretary Michael Chertoff 
replaced Secretary Tom Ridge.  Shortly upon his arrival Secretary Chertoff undertook a 
Second-Stage Review to systematically evaluate the Department’s operations, policies 
and structures (Chertoff, 2005).  The review was concluded in the summer of 2005 and 
Secretary Chertoff announced his new six point agenda to employees and Congress. The 
second stage review brought together 18 action teams with over 250 DHS employees.  
The action teams were asked to evaluate specific operation and policy issues.  Opinions 
were also sought from DHS partners of local, State, and tribal governments.  One of the 
goals of the second stage review was to “set a clear national strategy and design an 
architecture in which separate roles and responsibilities for security are fully integrated 
among public and private stakeholders” (Chertoff, 2005).  
The six-point agenda “is structured to guide the department in the near term and 
result in changes that will: 1) increase overall preparedness, particularly for catastrophic 
events; 2) create better transportation security systems to move people and cargo more 
securely and efficiently; 3) strengthen border security and interior enforcement and 
reform immigration processes; 4) enhance information sharing with our partners; 5) 
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improve DHS financial management, human resource development, procurement and 
information technology; and 6) realign the DHS organization to maximize mission 
performance” (DHS, Department Six-Point Agenda, 2008).  Chertoff (2005) recognized 
that “modest, but essential course corrections regarding the organization will yield big 
dividends.”  Even a modest change of the mission can lead to role conflict as people may 
not understand how their role fulfills the mission and how they contribute to the 
professed vision of the Department. 
Role Ambiguity 
Role ambiguity is the result of a lack of information regarding expectations for a 
role.  As stated previously role ambiguity can be created by organizational complexity, 
rapid organizational change, and managerial philosophies.  DHS has experienced all of 
these over the past five years.  Examining each agencies expectations before merging 
with DHS and then after to see if it appears to be compatible with DHS, it seems that 
most of the expectations were clear.  It also appears that expectations for the majority of 
agency’s merged into DHS were compatible.  The number one lack of clarity for 
expectations is to whom employees should direct questions.  Many of these agencies 
were still relying on their previous department for administrative tasks it was not clear 
who was setting the expectations and whose expectations employees should be fulfilling.  
The agencies that had to rely on their former Departments the most were, the Agricultural 
Quarantine Inspection, the Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster 
Medical System, and the Federal Protective Services. 
Employees may also have contradictory expectations for the department.  They 
may expect certain tasks to be accomplished in a specific way and they are not being 
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fulfilled that way anymore because the new Department has taken over that 
responsibility.  It appears that role ambiguity is the biggest problem within DHS since 
many of the missions of the agencies merged into DHS did not change and it appears that 
role conflict is not as present as role ambiguity.  The ramifications of role ambiguity are 
interference with mission accomplishment and performance.  This can also lead to 
employee turnover, which DHS cannot afford.     
Role Overload 
Role overload occurs when an organization or individual takes on too many roles.  
Role overload has negative and positive effects.  It appears that the majority of agencies 
merged into DHS had balance among the new roles that they assumed.  However, the 
Coast Guard should be very mindful of role overload, as should the National 
Infrastructure Protection Center.  Only a limited number of agencies took on new roles 
and it seems that many have built upon their previous roles to try to alleviate role 
overload for their employees.  To help alleviate both role conflict and role overload 
employees should try to merge any of these roles together.  If that is not possible they 
may be able to alternate between the two roles.  However, employees cannot sustain that 
for a long period of time as it can lead to many other conflicts.  One last resolution for 
role conflict or role overload is to ask for clarification of the roles by those who created 
it.  This is not always possible, but it is an excellent way to alleviate role conflict and 
overload.      
 Due to the fact that DHS has had difficulty setting up a national headquarters and 
the majority of the agencies have remained in their previous locations, DHS needs to 
work to create an organizational identity.  One way to do that is to try to take over the 
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administrative tasks that the other departments are currently doing.  Secretary Ridge 
began to take the human resources and accounting systems and merge them together to 
create one system for all employees.  This is a daunting task, but this will greatly 
contribute to creating a DHS organizational identity.  Secretary Chertoff has also helped 
to create the new identity with his second stage alignment.  When he became Secretary he 
tried to ensure that the alignment would help employees reduce some of the bureaucracy 
that they had encountered when DHS was first created.  
 One of the biggest sources of conflict was the manner in which the Department 
was created.  All of the agencies heard rumor and speculation surrounding the creation 
the new Department, which most likely contributed to employees not wanting to make 
the transition.  Another problem that still has not been addressed was the realignment of 
Congress.  DHS still has to respond to an exorbitant amount of Congressional 
committees.  According to Veronique De Rugy (2006) “Even after the combination of 
more than two dozen agencies, committee chairs have been unwilling to relinquish much 
of their jurisdiction over the 22 agencies and activities transferred to DHS. As a result, 
last year alone the leaders of DHS had to appear before 88 congressional committees and 
subcommittees.”  This takes up significant time when trying to get a Department up and 
running.  Another source of conflict is the territorial issues that occur within Congress 
and those agencies that became a part of DHS.  DHS felt this most acutely when 
employees did not make the transition with their agency. 
 The turf wars are still ongoing with regards to homeland security funding.  One of 
the main reasons for creating DHS was to make a one-stop shop for states and local 
governments to get grant funding.  “Conversely, much homeland security spending takes 
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place outside of the department. The total amount directed to homeland security activities 
in fiscal year 2006 is roughly $50 billion. But departments other than DHS will spend 
$23 billion of that. Not surprisingly, a large portion--$9.5 billion--goes to the Department 
of Defense. But other funding decisions are more curious. Why, for instance, are the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Commerce Department, and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration receiving homeland security funds (De Rugy, 
2006)?”   
 Some of these agencies had never worked together before merging to create this 
new Department.  They had to establish programs and processes for working together.  
They needed to establish their organizational culture for working on new projects and 
expectations for the projects.  They had to establish ‘this is the way we do things around 
here’ which is time consuming and can have an effect of how someone performs their 
role within the organization. 
 Another source of conflict is that some roles were emphasized over others.  As 
many stated before 2005 FEMA focused on terrorism and forgot about natural disasters, 
that when the hurricanes struck in 2005 people were not prepared to deal with it.  Another 
example is TSA.  Many have stated that air transportation has been emphasized over all 
other transportation that other forms of transportation are not as secure.  Another agency 
where this may be apparent is the Coast Guard, as evidenced by the testimony before 
Congress.   
 Another area of conflict is the amount of audiences that DHS had to report to.  
Many of the agencies had to answer to DHS, Congress, the President, the American 
people, and their previous Department.  With more stakeholders there is less flexibility in 
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how the agencies perform their roles.  There is also less ability to make small changes 
and adjustments to their roles.  Also, there are more opportunities for expectations to be 
conflicted or not clear, which leads to role conflict and ambiguity.  This appears to be a 
big problem for the administration of grants.  The states and local governments want 
funds to pay for responders, but Congress does not allow this in the legislation.  Congress 
and the states want the grants distributed quickly, however there are a number of checks 
in place to ensure that the money is distributed correctly.  Parts of the country want the 
grants distributed on the basis of risk, however Congress wants to ensure that all parts of 
the country feel safe and get an allocation of money, so they added formulas to the grants.  
There are also a number of coordination issues and how to get the money distributed 
quickly and fairly as well as ensure that the states and local governments get answers to 
their questions and understand more about what they should be utilizing the funds for.  A 
lack of consensus among the audiences can be very daunting because employees may not 
understand the expectations of all the audiences.   
Lessons Learned 
 This is not the first agency that was created in this frankensteinian way.  One that 
was very similar in size to DHS was the Department of Defense.  FEMA was also created 
in a similar fashion.  The DOD merger is considered successful now, however it took a 
number of years for the agencies combined to learn to function together as a team.  Even 
after a number of years DOD employees still encounter some problems working together, 
however their roles are clearly laid out and most employees understand their role within 
the organization.  The DHS should create a way to explain each agencies role within the 
larger organization and how employees fit within that organization chart.  Employees 
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need to understand how their role works to fulfill the mission of the agency and how that 
agency works to fulfill the mission of the larger department.   
 One lesson for future mergers of this size with this amount of bureaucracy is to a 
have meeting with the employees who will be merged together before the merger to 
ensure that they understand the expectations for their organization within the new 
organization.  This will help employees to clarify any role conflict or ambiguity.  A 
dialogue between all employees that will be merged together would also be good for 
employees to air their concerns and address any organizational conflicts before they 
occur.  A dialogue would also be a good place for management to address any rumors 
that may be circulating and ensure that employees have factual information about what to 
expect with the merger.         
 Another lesson for future mergers is to clarify the roles of each agency to be 
merged within the organization by writing clear mission statements.  Many of the 
agencies within the DHS did not have their stated mission altered, however almost all of 
their missions changed.  The majority of agencies had to change their focus to include 
terrorism as well as their previous focus.  Each agency needs to understand how to 
achieve balance between the previous focus and the additional focus of terrorism.    
 Another lesson learned from this merger is the consolidation of Congressional 
committees.  This was recommended when by the U.S Commission on National 
Security/21st Century in early 2001 when they recommended the creation of a department 
focused on homeland security.  DHS will hopefully work as well as DOD does currently, 
but it took a number of years for DOD to obtain a level of cohesion.  DHS is still learning 
its way and getting used to working together.  Mergers and acquisitions take between five 
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and seven years in the private sector, DHS has been in existence for five years already 
and is performing progressively better.   
Limitations of the study         
 There are a number of limitations to this study.  The first being that there was no 
first hand data sought by employees of DHS.  Further study should be performed in this 
area.  There are a number of tools that measure role conflict, which could be given to 
actual DHS employees to examine how much role conflict, ambiguity, and overload they 
are experiencing.  One should determine if employees still identify with their old 
department or DHS.   
 The second limitation to this study is the problems and lack of consensus among 
role theorists over the theory itself.  Biddle states (1986), “confusion and malintegration 
persist in role theory.  Authors continue to differ over definitions for the role concept, 
over assumptions they make about roles, and over explanations for the role phenomena.  
And formal derivations for role propositions have been hard to find.”  Role theory has a 
number of limitations in that there is no grand theory present here.  Many theorists argue 
over the basic concepts including what expectations are, what a role is, and who is the 
role occupant.   
 Another area that should be studied further from this topic is whether the conflict 
for the role lies within the person or the role itself.  If a person that is occupying the role 
has different expectations for the role, how does that affect role conflict.  Applying this to 
DHS would be especially interesting in that the Department was new and some people 
would look at that as an opportunity to create their role, while others may not.  That could 
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have an effect on not just the employee occupying a particular role, but the agency in 
which that person works. 
 Another limitation to this study was only utilizing the mission statements to 
garner the expectations that Congress and the President have for the agencies.  This 
would require another area of further study to see where agencies get their expectations if 
not from the mission statement.  This study also utilized legislation, however there are 
questions there because the legislation to set-up that outlines the mission and duties of the 
agency may not be as up to date as the role they are fulfilling.  While this is not 
necessarily an issue within DHS, as time goes on it does become more of one.  
 The complaints regarding grant funding have not changed since DHS began 
giving out grants in 2001 immediately following September 11th.  Every year DHS has 
changed the grant process and that is part of the conflict between the states and DHS.  
Many states believe that DHS was created to fix the problem related to grant funding 
however, because DHS has been in constant flux for the past five years the grant process 
has been in flux for the past five years.  Now that another election year and 
Administration change is upon us DHS will change again.  From the outside it appears 
that DHS agencies have their missions in order, and that will contribute to the employees 
understanding their role.  However, management should always be conscious to convey 
each employee’s role within the offices, bureaus, agencies, and the Department as a 
whole.    
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Department of Homeland 
Security 
The mission of DHS: (A) prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; (B) reduce the 
vulnerability of the U.S. to terrorism; (C) minimize the damage, and assist in the 
recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the U.S.; (D) carry out all 
functions of entities transferred to the DHS including by acting as a focal point 
regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning; (E) ensure that the 
functions of the agencies and subdivisions within the DHS that are not related directly 
to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit 
Act of Congress; (F) ensure that the overall economic security of the U.S. is not 
diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland; and 
(G) monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate 
efforts to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict 
illegal drug trafficking (Homeland Security Act of 2002) 
Organization Agency Mission in 2000 Mission in DHS 
1. The U.S. Customs Service 
(Treasury) 
 
We are the guardians of our Nation's 
borders - America's frontline. We serve 
and protect the American public with 
integrity, innovation, and pride. We 
enforce the laws of the United States, 
safeguard the revenue, and foster lawful 
international trade and travel. 
 
Became part of the CBP, whose mission 
is:  As the single unified border agency 
of the United States, the CBP mission is 
vitally important to the protection of 
America and the American people. 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/ab
out/mission/  
2. The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (part) 
(Justice) 
 
The mission of INS is to administer and 
enforce the immigration and naturalization 
laws of the United States, including 
securing the Nation's borders and 
apprehending illegal immigrants. 
 
GAO highlights the fact that the mission is 
twofold: one is enforcement that prevents 
illegal immigrants from entering the 
country and removing those that do; the 
other is a service function that provides 
INS was disbanded by the Homeland 
security act of 2002.  The agency was 
separated into Customs and Border 
Patrol, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, Office of Policy and 
Programs in Under Secretary for 
Management, and the Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Service.  
Employees went to one of the above new 
bureaus within DHS.     
Appendix A – Outline of Agency Missions 
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services and benefits to facilitate entry, 
residence, employment, and the 
naturalization of legal immigrants. (This 
was highlighted in a report in 1999 and 
2000.) 
3. The Federal Protective 
Service 
 
According to Commission Peck, 2000:  
First, here's what our changes in FPS are 
all about. We started by defining the FPS 
mission and objective; they had not been 
clear before. The objective is for FPS to 
become the best facilities security 
organization in the world. The principal 
mission is building security, by which we 
mean protecting the affected facility, its 
tenants, visitors and their property from 
harm. As Assistant Commissioner 
Edwards, a veteran police officer and our 
top FPS official, says: FPS is not a police 
organization; it is a facility security 
organization with law enforcement 
authority. 
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/content
View.do?pageTypeId=8169&channelId=-
18801&P=XAE&contentId=11765&conte
ntType=GSA_BASIC accessed on March 
17, 2007 
The Department of Homeland Security's 
(DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) 
provides law enforcement and security 
services to over one million tenants and 
daily visitors to federally owned and 
leased facilities nationwide. FPS' 
protection services focus directly on the 
interior security of the nation, and 
require close coordination and 
intelligence sharing with the 
investigative functions within DHS. FPS 
is a full service agency with a 
comprehensive HAZMAT, Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD), Canine, and 
emergency response program as well as 
state-of-the-art communication and 
dispatch Mega centers.   
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/channe
lView.do?pageTypeId=8195&channelPa
ge=/ep/channel/gsaOverview.jsp&chann
elId=-12951  
4. The Transportation 
Security Administration 
(Transportation) 
 
TSA was federalized in 2001   We are the Transportation Security 
Administration, formed immediately 
following the tragedies of Sept. 11.  Our 
agency is a component of the 
Department of Homeland Security and is 
responsible for security of the nation's 
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transportation systems. 
5. Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center (Treasury) 
 
The mission didn’t change from before; 
the authority just went to DHS.   
 
We train those who protect our 
homeland.  Vision: We must provide 
fast, flexible, and focused training to 
secure and protect America.  From their 
website accessed on March 16, 2007 
 
FLETC's mission statement and 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) 
signed by over 80 Partner Organizations 
clearly outline the Center's role and 
responsibilities. FLETC is the primary 
provider of career-long federal law 
enforcement training and prepares law 
enforcement professionals to fulfill their 
responsibilities safely and proficiently. 
The purpose of the program is to provide 
Federal, state, local, and international 
agents and officers who graduate FLETC 
the skills and knowledge needed to 
perform their law enforcement functions 
effectively and professionally. The 
program develops uniform standards for 
training programs, facilities and 
instructors to ensure high caliber training 
across agencies. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expect
more/detail/10000014.2005.html  
6. Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service 
(part)(Agriculture) 
 
APHIS provides leadership in ensuring the 
health and care of animals and plants, 
improving agricultural productivity and 
competitiveness, and contributing to the 
Within the APHIS structure, animal 
quarantine inspection activities at ports 
of entry were transferred from the 
Veterinary Services (VS) division to the 
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national economy and the public health.  
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps3025/
mission.html   
 
The APHIS mission satisfies five strategic 
goals. They include: 
(1) safeguarding plant and animal 
resources from foreign pests and diseases;  
(2) minimizing production losses and 
export market disruptions by quickly 
detecting and responding to outbreaks of 
agricultural pests and diseases; 
(3) minimizing risks to agricultural 
production, natural resources, and human 
health and safety by effectively managing 
pests and diseases and wildlife damages; 
(4) ensuring the humane care and 
treatment of animals; and, 
(5) developing safe and effective scientific 
pest and disease control methods.  
 
http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/downloa
d/MRP-Hawks-3.12.03.pdf  
Plant Protection division in 1974.  As a 
result, the Plant Protection Division 
became Plant Protection and Quarantine 
(PPQ).  In 2002 the majority of port 
inspection activities were transferred to 
the newly formed Department of 
Homeland Security’s Customs and 
Border Protection.  
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/about_aphis/
history.shtml  
 
Homeland Security and Agricultural 
Border Protection. Traditionally, 
APHIS’ Agricultural Quarantine 
Inspection (AQI) program has had 
responsibility for excluding agricultural 
health threats. Annually, thousands of 
inspectors have inspected hundreds of 
thousands of cargo shipments and tens of 
millions of passengers’ baggage arriving 
in the United States. They have 
intercepted tons of materials whose entry 
could jeopardize the agricultural sector. 
They have successfully excluded such 
threats as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) 
and bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE), which could have devastated not 
only the agricultural sector, but other 
sectors of the economy as well. 
That responsibility is now shared with 
the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). While most AQI staff are 
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reassigned to the new Department, 
USDA retains the responsibility for 
promulgating regulations related to entry 
of passengers and commodities into the 
United States. We intend to work closely 
with our counterparts in DHS. USDA 
retains the direct role of ensuring that 
passengers and cargoes traveling from 
Hawaii and Puerto Rico comply with 
specified regulations to protect the health 
of the agricultural sector on the 
Mainland, including necessary 
quarantines. We retain responsibility for 
collecting the user fees and will be 
periodically reimbursing DHS for their 
inspection services. 
http://www.usda.gov/agency/ocr/downlo
ad/MRP-Hawks-3.12.03.pdf  
7. Office for Domestic 
Preparedness (Justice) 
 
ODP was part of the Office for Justice 
Programs within the DOJ.  The mission in 
2000 was: To provide leadership in 
developing the nation’s capacity to 
prevent and control crime, administer 
justice, and assist crime victims.   
http://www.ojp.gov/annualreport/fy00pdf.
pdf  
 
The Office for State and Local Domestic 
Preparedness was the office transferred.  
Their mission specifically was: To 
develop and implement a national 
program to enhance the capacity of State 
DHS office responsible for enhancing 
the capacity of state and local 
jurisdictions to respond to, and mitigate 
the consequences of, incidents of 
domestic terrorism.  
Now the office of grants and training, 
switch was made in 2005.   
 
The mission of G&T is to prepare 
America for acts of domestic terrorism 
by developing and implementing a 
national program to enhance the capacity 
of state and local agencies to respond to 
incidents of terrorism, particularly those 
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and local agencies to respond to WMD 
terrorist incidents through coordinated 
training, equipment acquisition, technical 
assistance, and support state and local 
exercise training.   
http://www.mipt.org/pdf/puttingcttoworka
ppendixp.pdf  
 
We have proposed the establishment of 
the Office of State and Local Domestic 
Preparedness Support (OSLDPS) within 
OJP to provide funds for equipment, 
training and technical assistance to state 
and local authorities and emergency 
responders. OSLDPS is proposed as one 
mechanism through which we will 
implement the mandate given to the 
Justice Department by this Committee to 
enhance the capabilities of state and local 
jurisdictions to better respond to incidents 
of domestic terrorism.  Statement of Janet 
Reno from 1999 to Congress  
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimon
y/1999/agappro020499.htm  
 
 
involving chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear and explosive 
(CBRNE) incidents, through coordinated 
training, equipment acquisition, 
technical assistance, and support for 
Federal, state, and local exercises. 
 
G&T fulfills this mission through a 
series of program efforts responsive to 
the specific requirements of state and 
local agencies. G&T works directly with 
emergency responders and conducts 
assessments of state and local needs and 
capabilities to guide the development 
and execution of these programs. 
Assistance provided by G&T is directed 
at a broad spectrum of state and local 
emergency responders, including 
firefighters, emergency medical services, 
emergency management agencies, law 
enforcement, and public officials.  
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/about/mis
sion.htm  
 
In 2005, SLGCP was incorporated under 
the Preparedness Directorate as the 
Office of Grants and Training (G&T).  
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/about/ove
rview.htm  
8. The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) 
 
The mission of FEMA is to reduce the 
loss of life and property and protect our 
institutions from all hazards by leading 
Lead America to prepare for, prevent, 
respond to and recover from disasters. 
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and supporting the Nation in a 
comprehensive, risk-based emergency 
management program of mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery.   
9. Strategic National 
Stockpile and the National 
Disaster Medical System 
(HHS) 
 
The original mission of the National 
Disaster Medical System was to support 
state and local health agencies during 
natural disasters and to provide back-up 
support to DOD and Veterans 
Administration medical systems during 
times of overseas conflict.   
http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/200
51209095733-01279.pdf  
 
CDC's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) 
has large quantities of medicine and 
medical supplies to protect the American 
public if there is a public health 
emergency (terrorist attack, flu outbreak, 
earthquake) severe enough to cause local 
supplies to run out. Once Federal and 
local authorities agree that the SNS is 
needed, medicines will be delivered to any 
state in the U.S. within 12 hours. Each 
state has plans to receive and distribute 
SNS medicine and medical supplies to 
local communities as quickly as possible.  
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/  
The mission of the NDMS has not 
changed.  Eric Tolbert’s testimony in 
2003 to the House highlighted what the 
NDMS does and the response teams.   
http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/sched
ule108/apr03/4-10-03o/etolbert.pdf  
 
DHS is now responsible for determining 
when and where the stockpile should be 
deployed, but HHS continues to manage 
the stockpile with assistance by the VA.   
http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/sched
ule108/apr03/4-10-03o/etolbert.pdf  
10. Nuclear Incident Response 
Team (Energy) 
 
If the US gets nuked by terrorists, the 
Nuclear Incident Response Team is ready 
to help. The organization offers experts 
and equipment to handle nuclear 
The NIRT will operate at the direction of 
the Secretary in connection with an 
actual or threatened terrorist attack, 
major disaster, or other emergency 
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terrorism, emergencies, and accidents. The 
team's personnel provide expertise in areas 
such as device assessment and 
disablement, intelligence analysis, 
credibility assessment, intelligence 
analysis, and health physics. The 
organization works with other emergency 
response groups and engages in drills to 
prepare for emergency situations. The 
Nuclear Incident Response Team is part of 
the Department of Homeland Security. 
http://www.answers.com/topic/nuclear-
incident-response-team?cat=biz-fin  
 
http://www.ndu.edu/library/docs/crs/crs_r
s22023_11jan05.pdf Includes a bit about 
what NIRT is.   
 
within the US.  When there is no need 
the EPA and Secretary of DOE will still 
be responsible for the NIRT.  Section 
504 of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com
/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hsa2002.pdf      
 
The Secretary of Energy shall retain 
primary responsibility for organizing, 
training, and equipping the NIRT’s.   
http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs
/billsandreports/107thcongress/hr5005m
grsamendsummary.pdf  
 
11. Domestic Emergency 
Support Teams (Justice) 
 
The Domestic Emergency Support Team 
(DEST) is a stand-by interagency team of 
experts that can be quickly assembled in 
accordance with pre-event scenarios and 
led by the FBI to provide an on-scene 
commander (Special Agent in Charge) 
with advice and guidance in situations 
involving a weapon of mass destruction 
(WMD), or other significant domestic 
threat. Such DEST guidance could range 
from information management and 
communications support to instructions on 
how to best respond to the detonation of a 
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon, 
Domestic Emergency Support Teams 
previously under the Department of 
Justice that expeditiously provide expert 
advice, guidance and support to the 
Federal On-Scene Commander during an 
incident involving weapons of mass 
destruction or a credible threat.   
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pres
s_release_0100.shtm   
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or a radiological dispersal device. As 
specialized predesignated teams, DEST 
has no permanent staff at the FBI or at any 
other federal agency.   
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21367.pdf   
 
Response to terrorism: After an incident 
has occurred, a rapidly deployable 
interagency Emergency Support Team 
(EST) will provide required capabilities 
on scene: a Foreign Emergency Support 
Team (FEST) for foreign incidents, and a 
Domestic Emergency Support Team 
(DEST) for domestic incidents. DEST 
membership will be limited to those 
agencies required to respond to the 
specific incident. Both teams will include 
elements for specific types of incidents 
such as nuclear, chemical, and biological 
threats.  Presidential Directive 39 1995 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/pdd39
.htm 
12. National Domestic 
Preparedness Office (FBI) 
 
The National Domestic Preparedness 
Office coordinates all federal efforts, 
including those of the Department of 
Defense, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, Department of Health and 
Human Services, Department of Energy, 
and the Environmental Protection Agency, 
to assist state and local first responders 
with planning, training, equipment, and 
exercise necessary to respond to a 
Became the Office of Grants and 
Training:  
 
The mission of G&T is to prepare 
America for acts of domestic terrorism 
by developing and implementing a 
national program to enhance the capacity 
of state and local agencies to respond to 
incidents of terrorism, particularly those 
involving chemical, biological, 
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conventional or non-conventional weapon 
of mass destruction (WMD) incident.   
http://www.chaosacrossamerica.com/OHS
/Departments/NDPO.htm  
 
Through the National Domestic 
Preparedness Office (NDPO), the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) led the 
earliest efforts to coordinate federal 
assistance to first responders in the area of 
domestic terrorism preparedness. NDPO 
was established in the FBI by order of the 
Attorney General in August 1998 to serve 
as a single point of contact—a “one-stop 
shop”—through which state and local 
authorities could seek interagency 
assistance in the areas of planning, 
training, equipment, and exercises to 
better prepare for domestic terrorist 
incidents—particularly those involving 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). 
NDPO’s role was not operational, and the 
Office was not responsible for producing 
intelligence, preempting terrorist attacks, 
directly responding to terrorists attacks, or 
conducting investigations.  Prior to the 
homeland security debate, the functions of 
NDPO were transferred from the FBI to 
FEMA as part of a wider and earlier effort 
by the Bush Administration to consolidate 
all federal domestic preparedness 
programs in a single agency. One 
radiological, nuclear and explosive 
(CBRNE) incidents, through coordinate 
training, equipment acquisition, 
technical assistance, and support for 
Federal, state and local exercises. 
 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/about/mission.h
tm 
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2002news report stated that “the office has 
been defunct since last year and has no 
employees, but it never has been officially 
closed.”   
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21367.pdf  
 
13. CBRN Countermeasures 
Programs (Energy) 
 
The mission and focus of these programs 
did not change when merged into DHS. 
Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory 2004 
2.3.5.1 Chemical and Biological 
Countermeasures Program 
This program focuses on addressing the 
national needs for technologies to 
quickly detect, identify, and mitigate the 
use of chemical and biological threat 
agents against the U.S. civilian 
population. The principal program is the 
Chemical and Biological National 
Security Program, within which are 
several notable projects, including the 
Biological Aerosol Sentry and 
Information System Project, 
Autonomous Pathogen Detection 
System, Advanced Biodetection 
Technology, Biological Signatures, the 
Forensic Science Center, in situ 
Chemical Sensors, and Remote 
Chemical Sensing. 
2.3.5.2 Nuclear and Radiological 
Countermeasures Program 
The Nuclear and Radiological 
Countermeasures Program develops 
technical capabilities aimed at 
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countering the threat of terrorist use of a 
nuclear or radiological device in or near 
a U.S. population center, or from 
detecting and tracking nuclear material 
to forensic attribution in the event of a 
nuclear incident. Projects include nuclear 
emergency response, cargo container 
security, radiation detection, and 
detection and tracking systems.  
http://www.eh.doe.gov/nepa/docs/deis/ei
s0348/volume_1/VolumeI-chap2.pdf  
14. Environmental 
Measurements Laboratory 
(Energy) 
 
The laboratory is part of DoE. It measures 
and evaluates radiation in the 
environment.   
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/
PubLibrary/B.20020912.Prospects_for_th
e_/B.20020912.Prospects_for_the_.php  
 
The Environmental Measurements 
Laboratory conducts scientific and 
technical investigations related to 
environmental surveillance and 
monitoring, site and facility 
characterization and decontamination and 
decommissioning. The Environmental 
Measurements Laboratory provides the 
Department of Energy and other Federal 
agencies with a responsive and objective 
technical capability to: assure sampling, 
measurement and analysis quality and 
assess risk of human exposure to 
radioactivity and other energy-related 
The Environmental Measurements 
Laboratory (EML), a government-
owned, government-operated laboratory, 
is part of the Science and Technology 
(S&T) Directorate of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). The 
Laboratory advances and applies the 
science and technology required for 
preventing, protecting against, and 
responding to radiological and nuclear 
events in the service of Homeland and 
National Security. 
 
EML’s current programs focus on issues 
associated with environmental radiation 
and radioactivity. Specifically, EML 
provides DHS with environmental 
radiation and radioactivity measurements 
in the laboratory or field, technology 
development and evaluation, personnel 
training, instrument calibration, 
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pollutants. The Environmental 
Measurements Laboratory provides the 
Department and other Federal agencies 
with an inhouse, high quality scientific 
capability to address important issues 
related to national security. 
http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/01budget/
defem/prgdir.pdf   
 
 
 
performance testing, data management, 
and data quality assurance. 
http://www.research.umd.umich.edu/file
admin/template/researchsponsored/files/
DOE_Labs.doc  
 
http://sphweb02.umdnj.edu/sphweb/files
/bio/cv/Erickson_Apr-20-2006_CV.doc 
States: “In formation of the Department 
of Homeland Security, Congress directed 
that EML transfer from the Department 
of Energy into the Science and 
Technology Directorate of DHS.  This 
transition entailed change of both 
mission and administrative relationships.  
EML rapidly and expertly built upon its 
core competencies to meet the new 
mission of advancing and applying the 
science and technology required for 
preventing, protecting against, and 
responding to radiological and nuclear 
events in the service of Homeland and 
National Security.”   
15. National BW Defense 
Analysis Center (Defense) 
 
This center is a DoD research facility 
chartered to develop countermeasures for 
terrorist attacks.   
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/
PubLibrary/B.20020912.Prospects_for_th
e_/B.20020912.Prospects_for_the_.php  
 
Mission is to develop countermeasures to 
potential attacks by terrorists using 
The $420 million included in the 
president's fiscal 2003 Defense 
Department's budget for the military 
chemical and biological defense program 
would be transferred to the Homeland 
Security Department. It would be used to 
establish the National Bioweapons 
Defense Analysis Center, which would 
have the mission of coordinating 
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weapons of mass destruction.   
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/lib
rary/congress/2002_hr/80431.pdf  
 
SEC. 907. NATIONAL BIO-WEAPONS 
DEFENSE ANALYSIS CENTER. 
There is established in the Department of 
Defense a National Bio-Weapons Defense 
Analysis Center, whose mission is to 
develop countermeasures to potential 
attacks by terrorists using weapons of 
massdestruction.   
http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomela
nd/bill/title9.html#907  
countermeasures to potential attacks by 
terrorists using weapons of mass 
destruction.   
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsar
ticle.aspx?id=43669   
 
Mission and Objectives: 
HSPD-10 outlines four essential pillars 
of the nation’s biodefense program and 
provides specific directives to further 
strengthen the significant gains made in 
the past three years. 
The four pillars of the program are: 
• Threat Awareness, which includes 
biological weapons-related intelligence, 
vulnerability assessments, and 
anticipation of future threats. New 
initiatives will improve our ability to 
collect, analyze, and disseminate 
intelligence on biological weapons and 
their potential 
users. 
• Prevention and Protection, which 
includes interdiction and critical 
infrastructure protection. New initiatives 
will improve our ability to detect, 
interdict, and seize weapons 
technologies and materials to disrupt the 
proliferation trade, and to pursue 
proliferators through strengthened law 
enforcement cooperation. 
• Surveillance and Detection, which 
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includes attack warning and attribution. 
New initiatives will further strengthen 
the biosurveillance capabilities being put 
in place in fiscal year 2005. 
• Response and Recovery, which 
includes response planning, mass 
casualty care, risk communication, 
medical countermeasures, and 
decontamination. New initiatives will 
strengthen our ability to provide mass 
casualty care and to decontaminate the 
site of an attack. 
The Department of Homeland Security 
has a role and responsibility in each of 
these four pillars of the national 
biodefense program. The S&T 
Directorate has the responsibility to lead 
the Department’s RDT&E activities to 
support the national biodefense 
objectives and the Department’s mission.  
* Renamed the National Bio-Defense 
Analysis and Countermeasures Center 
The NBACC’s mission will support two 
pillars of this blueprint – threat 
awareness and surveillance and 
detection. The NBACC is made up of 
two centers, the Biological Threat 
Characterization Center and the National 
Bioforensic Analysis Center to carry out 
these missions. 
Specifically, NBACC’s mission is to: 
• Understand current and future 
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biological threats, assess vulnerabilities, 
and determine potential impacts to guide 
the research, development, and 
acquisition of biodefense 
countermeasures such as detectors, 
drugs, vaccines and decontamination 
technologies; and 
• Provide a national capability for 
conducting forensic analysis of evidence 
from biocrimes and terrorism to attain a 
“biological fingerprint”   In FY 2004, the 
Department completed the planning and 
conceptual design of the NBACC 
facility.   
http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2005_02
_08/albright.pdf   
16. Plum Island Animal 
Disease Center (Agriculture) 
 
Scientists at Plum Island conduct research 
and diagnostics on animal diseases that 
are not present in the U.S., but could pose 
a major economic threat to agriculture 
here.   ARS owns and operates the island, 
and conducts research on foot-and-mouth 
disease, African swine fever, hog cholera, 
and vesicular somatitis. The APHIS 
Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic 
Laboratory has diagnostic and training 
responsibilities for these and other foreign 
diseases. As PIADC director, Huxsoll will 
coordinate the activities of both.   
http://ars.usda.gov/is/pr/2000/000602.2.ht
m   June 2, 2000 
Plum Island Animal Disease Center is a 
At the Plum Island Animal Disease 
Center, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) has an important 
job. 
We work to protect farm animals, 
farmers and ranchers, the nation's farm 
economy and export markets... and your 
food supply.  
Plum Island is located off the 
northeastern tip of New York's Long 
Island. USDA activities at Plum Island 
are carried out by scientists and 
veterinarians with the department's 
Agricultural Research Service (ARS) 
and Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS).  
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US Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
facility devoted to diagnosing and 
researching foreign diseases of animals. 
Named for the beach plums that grow 
along its shores, Plum Island's ownership 
was transferred to the USDA's 
Agricultural Research Service (ARS) in 
1954 to establish a laboratory to study 
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and other 
exotic animal diseases. The diagnostic 
activities at Plum Island were transferred 
from ARS to the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) in 1983. 
Since then, under the administration of 
ARS, APHIS has maintained a foreign 
animal disease diagnostic laboratory 
(FADDL) on the island.   
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/facilit
y/plum_island.htm  
We're proud of our role as America's 
first line of defense against foreign 
animal diseases.  
We're equally proud of our safety record. 
Not once in our nearly 50 years of 
operation has an animal pathogen 
escaped from the island. 
In 2003 the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) joined us on the island, 
taking responsibility for the safety and 
security of the facility. 
http://www.ars.usda.gov/main/site_main.
htm?modecode=19400000  
17. Federal Computer Incident 
Response Center (GSA) 
 
FedCIRC, in order to further secure our 
government technology systems and 
services. 
 
FedCIRC is a collaborative partnership 
drawing on the skills and resources within 
Government, academia, and the private 
sector to address computer security related 
incidents. Federal civilian agencies turn to 
FedClRC for assistance in identifying, 
containing and recovering from adverse 
events that impact on the confidentiality, 
integrity or availability of information 
It appears as if the FedCIRC is now the 
US-CERT.   
 
The United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team (US-CERT) is a 
partnership between the Department of 
Homeland Security and the public and 
private sectors. Established in 2003 to 
protect the nation's Internet 
infrastructure, US-CERT coordinates 
defense against and responses to cyber 
attacks across the nation. The Federal 
Computer Incident Response Center 
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traversing the critical information 
infrastructure. 
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/content
View.do?noc=T&contentType=GSA_BA
SIC&contentId=11775  
 
Federal Computer Incident Response 
Center. The center assists agencies with 
incident prevention and response.   
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organizatio
n/13679.pdf  
 
Developed FedCIRC in 1996 as a pilot 
program. It became operational in 1998 
and was moved to GSA's Federal 
Technology Service. The overarching 
mission of the FedCIRC is to be the 
Federal Civilian Government's trusted 
focal point for computer security incident 
reporting, sharing information on common 
vulnerabilities, and to provide assistance 
with incident prevention and response.   
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/content
View.do?contentId=11782&contentType=
GSA_BASIC  
Four activities performed by the 
FedCIRC: 
*Provide timely technical assistance to 
operators of agency information systems 
regarding security incidents, including 
guidance on detecting and handling 
information security incidents 
(FedCIRC), established in Oct 1996 by 
the National Institute for Science and 
Technology (NIST) as a pilot program 
and taken over by the General Services 
Administration (GSA) in October 1998 
as an operational entity, formed the 
initial nucleus of the US-CERT when 
DHS was established in March 2003. 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/priva
cy/privacy_pia_nppd_24x7.pdf  
 
http://www.us-cert.gov/press_room/us-
cert-announced.html    
The US-CERT will complement current 
security capabilities, including the 
Federal Computer Incident Response 
Center (FedCIRC), which coordinates 
incident warning and response 
information across Federal Civilian 
Government agencies.   
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*Compile and analyze information about 
incidents that threaten information 
security . 
*Inform operators of agency information 
systems about current and potential 
information security threats and 
vulnerabilities. 
*Consult with agencies or offices 
operating or exercising control of national 
security systems. 
         
18. National Communications 
System (Defense) 
 
The National Communications System, an 
interagency body of 22 federal 
departments and agencies, would transfer 
from the Defense Department to the 
Homeland Security Department.   
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarti
cle.aspx?id=43669  
 
 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/exec
ordr/eo12472.htm EO 12472 by Regan in 
84 outlined new mission, amended in 
2003 
 
On November 15, 2005, the NCS 
became part of the Department's 
Directorate for Preparedness after nearly 
two years under the Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
Directorate.    
Created by Kennedy after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis:  The NCS mandate 
included linking, improving, and 
extending the communications facilities 
and components of various Federal 
agencies, focusing on interconnectivity 
and survivability.   With the addition of 
the Office of the Director, National 
Intelligence in September 2007, the NCS 
membership currently stands at 24 
members.   
http://www.ncs.gov/about.html  
 
http://www.ncs.gov/org_chart.html Org 
chart outlines what exactly NCS is 
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responsible for: 
• Providing the expertise for the 
planning, implementing, 
administering, and maintenance of 
approved national security and 
emergency preparedness (NS/EP) 
communications programs and NCS 
baseline activities. 
 
• Conducting technical studies, 
analyses, and assessments pertaining 
to the effectiveness of NS/EP 
communications programs and the 
effects of these programs on the 
Nation's critical infrastructures. 
 
• Consulting with the Committee of 
Principals (COP), the NCS Council of 
Representatives (COR), and the 
President’s National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory 
Committee (NSTAC) on issues 
pertaining to NS/EP 
telecommunications. 
 
• Participating on Federal councils and 
boards, such as the President's Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Board and 
the National Infrastructure Advisory 
Council (NIAC), that develop 
telecommunications policies, 
standards, national initiatives, and 
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performing research on emerging 
technologies. 
 
• Monitoring international emergency 
telecommunications planning 
activities and offering assistance to 
international emergency planning 
groups. 
 
• Developing, planning, and 
implementing National 
Communications System (NCS) 
strategic goals and objectives. 
 
• Assisting individual NCS member 
organizations in developing efficient 
cost- effective solutions to complex 
communication/information 
requirements and resolutions to 
organizational 
communication/information issues 
19. National Infrastructure 
Protection Center (FBI) 
 
Within the last year the NIPC was 
established to deter, detect, analyze, 
investigate and provide warnings of cyber 
threats and attacks on the critical 
infrastructures of the United States, 
including illegal intrusions into 
government and private sector computer 
networks. The NIPC will also evaluate, 
acquire, and deploy computer equipment 
and cyber tools to support investigations 
and infrastructure protection efforts. 
On May 22, 1998, the President issued 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 
(PDD-63), which called for the creation 
of a national plan to protect the services 
on which we depend daily. NIPC has 
moved from the FBI into the Department 
of Homeland Security under the 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection Directorate.  
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercri
me/critinfr.html   
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Statement by Janet Reno 1999 
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimon
y/1999/agappro020499.htm  
 
The National Infrastructure Protection 
Center (NIPC) at the FBI which will fuse 
representatives from FBI, DOD, USSS, 
Energy, Transportation, the Intelligence 
Community, and the private sector in an 
unprecedented attempt at information 
sharing among agencies in collaboration 
with the private sector. The NIPC will 
also provide the principal means of 
facilitating and coordinating the Federal 
Government's response to an incident, 
mitigating attacks, investigating threats 
and monitoring reconstitution efforts;   
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime
/factsh.htm   
 
The National Infrastructure Protection 
Center (NIPC), created by Attorney 
General Janet Reno and FBI Director 
Louis Freeh in February 1998, addresses 
the growing threat of illicit computer 
activity, particularly as it affects critical 
national infrastructures.  The mission of 
NIPC is to assess, warn of, respond to, and 
investigate illegal acts involving computer 
and information technologies, and 
unlawful acts that threaten or target our 
critical infrastructures.      
 
http://www.esisac.com/publicdocs/NICC
%20Watch%20Office%20Info.doc   
Recently, the former National 
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) 
was fully integrated into the Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
Directorate of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). As such, the 
responsibilities of fulfilling the mission 
of physical and cyber critical 
infrastructure assessment and protection 
of the former NIPC are now being 
addressed by two new divisions. 
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http://www.calea.org/Online/newsletter/N
o75/The%20National%20Infrastructure%
20Protection%20Center.htm   
20. Energy Security and 
Assurance Program (Energy) 
 
Mission did not change when merged into 
DHS 
http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/05budget
/content/otherdef/ea.pdf  The Energy 
Security and Assurance Program leads 
the Federal government’s effort to 
ensure a robust, secure, and reliable 
energy infrastructure in the new threat 
environment that includes malevolent 
threats and increasing complexity due to 
interdependencies. EA works with 
States, local governments, and the 
private sector to coordinate protection 
activities and cultivate collaborative 
partnerships to assure public safety, 
public confidence, and service in the 
energy sector. 
21. The Secret Service  
 
Mission did not change with merger   The United States Secret Service is 
mandated by statute and executive order 
to carry out two significant missions: 
protection and criminal investigations. 
The Secret Service protects the president 
and vice president, their families, heads 
of state, and other designated 
individuals; investigates threats against 
these protectees; protects the White 
House, vice president’s residence, 
foreign missions, and other buildings 
within Washington, D.C.; and plans and 
implements security designs for 
designated National Special Security 
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Events. The Secret Service also 
investigates violations of laws relating to 
counterfeiting of obligations and 
securities of the United States; financial 
crimes that include, but are not limited 
to, access device fraud, financial 
institution fraud, identity theft, computer 
fraud; and computer-based attacks on 
our nation’s financial, banking, and 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
http://www.secretservice.gov/mission.sht
ml 
 
With the growing threat of 
TERRORISM, the mission of the Secret 
Service has expanded. In 2000 Congress 
enacted the Presidential Threat 
Protection Act. This law authorized the 
Secret Service to participate in the 
planning, coordination, and 
implementation of security operations at 
special events of national significance 
("National Special Security Event"), as 
determined by the president.  
http://law.jrank.org/pages/10077/Secret-
Service.html 
22. The Coast Guard 
 
The six non-homeland security missions 
highlighted in the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002: marine safety, search and rescue, 
aids to navigation, living marine 
resources, marine environmental 
protections, and ice operations. 
Its core roles are to protect the public, 
the environment, and U.S. economic and 
security interests in any maritime region 
in which those interests may be at risk, 
including international waters and 
America's coasts, ports, and inland 
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The five homeland security missions 
added to the Coast Guard: ports, 
waterways, and coastal security, drug 
interdiction, migrant interdiction, defense 
readiness, and other law enforcement. 
 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/terrorism/hsa2002.pdf  
waterways.  To serve the public, the 
Coast Guard has five fundamental roles: 
Maritime Safety; Maritime Security; 
Maritime Mobility; National Defense; 
and Protection of Natural Resources.   
 
http://uscg.mil/top/missions/   
Sources: Customs info From this website 
http://www.traveloasis.com/uscustravin.ht
ml accessed on March 16, 2007 
 
INS info from 
http://www.flra.gov/fsip/finalact/01fs_21
0.html on March 17, 2007 
 
 FPS info from  TSA info  
http://www.tsa.gov/who_we_are/what_is
_tsa.shtm accessed on March 17, 2007 
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